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ARTICLE
BEARING THE CROSS
Tom Lininger*
INTRODUCTION
American legal culture seems to revere cross-examination.' According
to Wigmore, cross-examination is our greatest invention for truth seeking. 2
Cross-examination is the purest expression of our adversarial process. It is
the highlight of the trial for both jurors3 and lawyers. 4 It is the moment in
litigation when the best lawyers distinguish themselves. Many theorists
believe that a lawyer's highest ethical duty is to cross-examine zealously. 5
Hollywood celebrates cross-examination as well. From Atticus Finch6 to
Henry Drummond,7 our heroes on the silver screen reach their zenith during
* B.A., Yale; J.D., Harvard; Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. I
thank Sarah Buel, Carol Chase, George Fisher, Richard Friedman, John Langbein, Miguel
Mendez, Jennifer Mnookin, Myrna Raeder, Deborah Rhode, and Merle Weiner for their
helpful guidance. Eric Mitton's assistance with my early research was invaluable. Of
course, I am solely responsible for any mistakes in this Article.
1. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
823, 833 n.31 (1985) (contending that American esteem for cross-examination is "an article
of faith"); Chris W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
Stan. L. Rev. 291, 333-34 (2004) (discussing our legal culture's uncritical confidence in
cross-examination).
2. 2 John H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common
Law § 1367, at 1697 (1904).
3. State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 240 (Or. 1987) (en banc) (extolling "[tihe cherished
courtroom drama of confrontation"); Daniel M. Kotin, Ten Tips for Successful Cross-
Examination, Chi. Bar Ass'n Rec., Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 12 ("A strong cross-examination can
be the most dramatic part of a trial.").
4. Elizabeth A. Foley et al., Jury Challenges-Communication and Legal Perspectives,
in ATLA Winter Convention Reference Materials (2004), available at WINTER2004
ATLA-CLE 233 (on www.westlaw.com) (citing survey indicating that lawyers rank cross-
examination among their favorite parts of trial).
5. E.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: The O.J. Simpson Case and the
Criminal Justice System 145 (1996) (stating that defense lawyers are ethically bound to use
even distasteful tactics where necessary to advance their clients' interests); Monroe H.
Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1717, 1727
(2002) (extolling zealous advocacy by lawyers); Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The
Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Horrible Things, 28 Hofstra L. Rev.
925, 930-34, 954 (2002) (defending zealous cross-examination of an alleged victim in a hate
crime prosecution).
6. Atticus Finch, played by Gregory Peck, was the defense attorney in To Kill a
Mockingbird, a 1962 movie based on a Pulitzer Prize-winning novel by Harper Lee. The
American Film Institute ranks Finch as the greatest film hero in the last hundred years.
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cross-examination. What great movie locates its drama in a direct
examination?
Exactly one century after Wigmore's famous panegyric, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently resumed the encomium for cross-examination. In
Crawford v. Washington,8 Justice Scalia's majority opinion recounted the
English legal history that "burned into the general consciousness the vital
importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination." 9 Justice
Scalia lauded cross-examination as our best tool for testing the veracity of
witnesses. 10 Yet cross-examination is not simply a means to an end, wrote
Justice Scalia. It is an end in itself. There may be other possible methods
of ascertaining truth, but they cannot supplant cross-examination.11 Indeed,
in a criminal trial, a defendant's right to cross-examination is no less sacred
than his right to a jury trial. 12
This Article explores the darker side of cross-examination. Crawford is
both a paean to cross-examination and a pain to the cross-examined. The
renewed ardor of confrontation after Crawford may enhance the adversarial
system in the aggregate, but this salutary effect is little consolation to the
witness undergoing a grueling interrogation. A nonparty witness in a
criminal trial has the worst of both worlds. She must endure difficult
questioning, but as a nonparty, she has no opportunity to turn the tables on
American Film Institute, AFT's 100 Years . . . 100 Heroes and Villains,
http://afi.com/Docs/tvevents/pdf/handvlOO.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). Finch's "deft,
courtly, and persistent cross examination" revealed the innocence of his client in a rape trial,
but Finch could not prevent the biased jury from reaching a guilty verdict. Steven Lubet,
Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1339, 1340 (1999). Lubet noted that Finch's
cross-examination exploited prejudices about women and sex crimes. Id. at 1350-55.
7. In the 1960 film Inherit the Wind, based on the Scopes trial, Spencer Tracey played
Henry Drummond, the fictionalized version of Clarence Darrow. Drummond defended a
schoolteacher who was arrested for teaching evolutionary theory. Drummond persuaded the
prosecuting attorney to take the stand, and Drummond's devastating cross-examination was
"among the best moments in the history of American cinema." David Ray Papke, Law,
Cinema, and Ideology: Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950s, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1473, 1479
(2001).
8. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
9. Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
10. Id. at 61-62.
11. Justice Scalia in Crawford v. Washington wrote as follows:
To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which
there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.
Id. at61.
12. See id. at 62.
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the client of her interlocutor. 13 Worse still, she must depend on someone
else's attorney to object if the questions asked of her are improper. 14
Cross-examination is particularly agonizing for accusers in prosecutions
of domestic violence and sexual assault. The success of these prosecutions
usually depends on the accusers' credibility. The prosecution frequently
has no witness other the alleged victim. 15 In a "he said, she said" contest,
the defendant will naturally attempt to shift the focus from his own conduct
to the foibles of the alleged victim. 16 Psychological counseling, parallel
civil litigation, recent sexual history, emotional frailty-all are fair game for
cross-examination by defense counsel under current law. It's a simple
strategy: Try the accuser.17
The characterization of cross-examination as "revictimization" is hardly a
fresh insight.18 What's worth noting, however, is that circumstances over
the last few years have dramatically increased the extent and difficulty of
the cross-examination that accusers face in prosecutions of domestic
violence and sexual assault.
In 2004 and 2005, a series of Supreme Court rulings increased the
likelihood that accusers will need to testify, and widened the scope of
13. See Fed. R. Evid. 611, 614 (allowing parties and judges to examine witnesses);
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 6.54 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that
witnesses are examined by parties).
14. Anne W. Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary Rule: Dual
Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 New Eng. J. on Crim. &
Civ. Confinement 331, 362 (2005) (noting that rape victims generally do not have their own
attorneys when they testify in prosecutions of their assailants).
15. Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71 Fordham
L. Rev. 263, 302 n.171 (2002) (stating that in rape cases, there are usually no other witnesses
beyond the alleged victim and the defendant); Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and
Sensibility: Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic Abuse, 20 Harv. Women's L.J. 263
(1997) (noting that an accuser's credibility is crucial in domestic violence cases because
there are generally no witnesses other than the accuser and the accused).
16. For ease of reference, and to follow conventions in the literature, this Article will
use female pronouns for accusers and male pronouns for defendants. Most victims of
domestic violence are female. Matthew R. Durose et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Family
Violence Statistics: Including Statistics on Strangers and Acquaintances, No. NCJ 207846,
at 31-32 (2005). Most victims of rape and sexual assault are female as well. Shannan M.
Catalano, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization, 2003, No. NCJ 205455, at 7-8
(2004). Notwithstanding the preponderance of women among victims and the use of female
pronouns herein, this article's analysis of cross-examination applies with equal force to male
victims.
17. John Q. La Fond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offenders and the Law, 4 Psychol. Pub.
Pol'y & L. 3, 17 (1998) (discussing the common defense strategy of "trying the victim" in
rape cases); see infra Part II.B-G.
18. See generally State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tenn. 1997) ("It has been said
that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice--once by the offender and once
by the criminal justice system."); Andrew E. Taslitz, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom
111 (1999) (discussing the "second rape of victims by defense counsel"); Ann Althouse, The
Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88
Nw. U. L. Rev. 914, 955-56 (1994) (decrying the character assassination by defense
attorneys in rape trials).
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matters that accusers must discuss at trial. 19 This Article's recent survey of
sixty-two prosecutors' offices and twenty-two state sentencing commissions
confirmed the effect of the Supreme Court's rulings. 20 These decisions
have led prosecutors to call more accusers as witnesses in order to satisfy
the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. 21 The
decisions have restructured sentencing proceedings, requiring the
submission of more sentencing issues to juries, and necessitating more
testimony by accusers. 22 The decisions have created more uncertainty in
evidence law and sentencing law, enticing a growing number of defendants
to forego plea agreements and proceed to trial, if only to preserve the
defendants' appellate rights. 23 More trials, of course, mean more cross-
examination of accusers.
At the same time that the Supreme Court has necessitated more extensive
trial testimony by victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, a
number of other recent developments have exacerbated the stress that cross-
examination causes for accusers.24 Privilege laws that formerly protected
accusers are eroding. The prosecutions of Kobe Bryant and other
celebrities have demonstrated the weakness of rape shield laws, and have
shown the entire nation that the best defense is to vilify the accuser. The
general increase in sentences for domestic violence and rape-while surely
commendable-has led defendants to examine accusers more vigorously
due to the higher stakes. A higher number of accusers do not speak English
and feel uncomfortable in court due to cultural differences. Media coverage
of rape trials has grown, while the media's forbearance on matters of
accusers' privacy has waned. Finally, the new case law requiring victims'
participation at trial invites defendants to make cross-examination so
unpleasant that victims will decline to cooperate with the government,
necessitating dismissal of charges.
The victims' rights movement has complicated matters. 25 On the one
hand, the leaders of this movement deserve credit for promoting
understanding of victims' plight. On the other hand, the victims' rights
movement has ironically compounded the hardship of cross-examination by
19. These three decisions are Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For a
detailed discussion of these cases and their impact on cross-examination, see infra Part II.A.
20. The survey of prosecutors, conducted in 2004 and 2005, involved sixty-two
prosecutors' offices in California, Oregon, and Washington. These offices collectively have
jurisdiction for ninety percent of the three states' populations. The questions and answers
from the survey of prosecutors are set forth in Appendix A. The survey of state sentencing
commissions, conducted in the summer and fall of 2005, involved the executive directors of
all the state sentencing commissions in the United States, along with the sentencing
commission in the District of Columbia. The questions and answers from that survey are set
forth in Appendix B.
21. See infra Part II.A.1.
22. See infra Part II.A.2.
23. See infra Part II.A.2.
24. These various factors are discussed infra in Parts II.B-F.
25. See infra Part II.G.
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creating more junctures for victims' testimony at trial while failing to
ameliorate the ordeal of cross-examination. 26 Victims' advocates in some
states have lobbied to pass constitutional amendments that foreclose pretrial
depositions of victims by the defense. 27 Such rules disregard the advice of
battered women's activists and scholars who see pretrial testimony as an
opportunity for victims to avoid the trauma of trial while allowing the
confrontation required by the Sixth Amendment. 28
Why should policymakers and courts worry about the growing asperity
of cross-examination? As a general matter, victims' willingness to report
crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during cross-
examination. 29 The recognition of this phenomenon led to the passage of
the first rape shield laws three decades ago. 30 There is some evidence that
victims' fear of testifying has increased recently. Data released by the U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics in June 2005 indicate that privacy concerns have
become a more significant deterrent to the reporting of violence committed
26. In many states, victims' rights advocates have fought to make victims' voices heard
in criminal prosecutions. See generally Erin Ann O'Hara, Victim Participation in the
Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & Pol'y 229, 239-42 (2005) (noting the trend to interject victim
testimony more frequently in criminal prosecutions). Typically the spokespeople for these
campaigns are the relatives of children who have been murdered or kidnapped. These
spokespeople do not have much to fear in cross-examination, because their credibility is not
a central issue; defense counsel would be foolish to attack them and thereby alienate the jury.
These spokespeople have sought to create more opportunities for testimony by victims and
families at various stages of the prosecution. The movement has devoted comparatively
little attention to reforms that would mitigate the hardship of cross-examination for accusers
in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. See infra Part II.G.
27. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 5 (adopted in 1990); Idaho Const. art 1, § 22(8) (adopted in
1994); La. Const. art. 1, § 25 (adopted in 1998); Or. Const. art. 1, § 42(l)(c) (adopted in
1999).
28. Nicole A.F. Lindenmyer, Washington v. Crawford: Must Crime Victims Testify
Against the Defendant? 4 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.bwlap.org/taps/crawford.pdf (noting that depositions are less stressful for victims
than trial testimony, and encouraging prosecutors to arrange for pretrial depositions of
victims as a means of satisfying confrontation requirements); see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 784-97 (2005) (suggesting that greater pretrial
confrontation of accusers would ease their burden after Crawford); Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 511, 610-12 (2005) (advocating greater use of pretrial hearings to provide the
confrontation required by Crawford).
29. Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence
Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 907, 936-37 (2001) (listing
studies supporting the proposition that victims' reluctance to report rape goes up when cross-
examination at trial is more difficult); Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in
College Student Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy,
142 Educ. L. Rep. 11, 23, 29-30 (2000) (noting that in college disciplinary hearings
adjudicating allegations of date rape, the victims' willingness to file complaints depends on
the extent of adversarial examination).
30. 23 Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure:
Evidence § 5382 (2005) (analyzing the policy behind the federal rape shield law, and noting
proponents' concern that rape victims who feared embarrassment at trial would not seek
charges against their assailants); Cristina C. Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation of the Rape
Shield Laws, 51 Drake L. Rev. 45, 53-60 (2002) (reviewing the legislative history of federal
rape shield law).
20051 1357
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
by family members and intimate partners. 31  Victims' advocates in
particular areas of the country have noticed that an increasing number of
rape victims seek counseling but do not report the rapes to police due to
fears about testifying at trial. 32 Paradoxically, victims' aversion to trial
testimony makes them more vulnerable to repeated assaults.
The time has come to reconceptualize cross-examination in prosecutions
of domestic violence and sexual assault. The simple adversarial model does
not capture the complexity of trial dynamics and the multiplicity of interests
in the courtroom. A better model posits a trilateral adversarial process, in
which the defense, the prosecution, and the accuser all vie against one
another. The divergence of prosecutors' and accusers' interests has become
plain; just ask the battered woman jailed by the prosecutor on a material
witness warrant, or the rape victim who never heard an objection as defense
counsel recounted her sexual history, or the victim whom the prosecution
impeached ardently when she deviated from the "script. '33 So long as the
rules of evidence and courtroom procedure remain aligned along a bipolar
axis, the interests of the accuser will not receive the attention that they
deserve.
The challenge for policymakers is to fashion new rules for courtroom
procedure that will respect defendants' confrontation rights while reducing
accusers' anxiety about cross-examination. This Article presents a
comprehensive package of such proposals. Accusers should have separate
counsel with standing to object. Accusers need stronger evidentiary
31. Among women who declined to report violent crimes committed against them by
intimates (defined as current and former spouses and boyfriends), the percentage citing
privacy concerns has grown considerably in recent years. A 1998 report indicated that
15.4% of non-reporting victims cited privacy concerns as the reason for their reluctance to
file complaints against their assailants. A follow-up report in June 2005 indicated that
33.8% of non-reporting victims cited privacy concern as their reason for not filing
complaints against assailants who were boyfriends or girlfriends; 25.1% of non-reporting
victims cited privacy concerns as their reason for not reporting violent crimes committed
against them by spouses. Compare Lawrence A. Greenfield et al., Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Violence by Intimates: Analysis of Data on Crimes by Current or Former
Spouses, Boyfriends, and Girlfriends, No. NCJ-167237, at 19 (1998) (setting forth data for
the years 1992 through 1996), with Durose et al., supra note 16, at 26 (setting forth data for
the years 1998 through 2002).
32. Elaine D'Aurizio, Kobe Bryant Rape Case Seen Having a Chilling Effect, Rec. N.
N.J., June 15, 2004, at Al (faulting the Bryant case for underreporting of rape); Blaine
Harden, Bryant Case Is Called a Setback, Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 2004, at A8 (stating that
employees at Rape Victim Advocates of Chicago-the largest rape crisis center in the
Midwest-reported that rape victims sought counseling but did not want to press charges
due to fears related to the Bryant case); Cathy Maestri & Ben Goad, Southern California
Activists Decry Bryant Decision, Riverside Press-Enterprise, Sept. 3, 2004, at A01 (stating
that in Riverside, California, there was no decline in the number of rape victims seeking
counseling, but the number of victims willing to press criminal charges did decline due to
fears about the ordeal of trial); CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2004),
available at 2004 WL 74303558 (noting that reports of sexual assault at the University of
Northern Colorado, where Bryant's accuser was a freshman, dropped twenty-five percent
after the case broke and the victim's character was impugned; local victims' advocates
indicated that assaults had not dropped, but victims' willingness to report had decreased).
33. See infra Part 1V.A.
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privileges, better rape shield laws, pretrial notice of certain impeachment
strategies, and the right to testify in narrative form at intervals during cross-
examination. The rules of evidence should allow more liberal use of prior
consistent statements, should prohibit impeachment of accusers by
reference to parallel civil suits, and should place more sensible constraints
on the introduction of "prior bad acts" against both accusers and defendants.
Pro se defendants should not be able to cross-examine accusers directly.
Sentencing guidelines should not condition "acceptance of responsibility"
upon assistance to the prosecutor, but rather upon the defendant's conduct
vis-A-vis the accuser at trial. Finally, legislatures should impose severe
criminal penalties for disclosure of sensitive information about accusers
derived from in camera hearings adjudicating motions in limine.
A victim of domestic violence or sexual assault should not be the fulcrum
upon which courts balance the interests of prosecution and defense. Such
an instrumental conception of the victim offends Kantian deontological
notions of moral autonomy. 34 And even Bentham would recognize the
pragmatic problem: A criminal justice system that scares off victims will
soon be out of business. 35
I. THE CRUCIBLE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN PROSECUTIONS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
Before exploring the recent developments that have heightened accusers'
fear of cross-examination in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual
assault, it is important to consider the baseline circumstances that have
always made cross-examination difficult for accusers in such prosecutions.
The literature on this topic is extensive, but a brief summary will set the
stage for the analysis that follows.
Perhaps the most important reason for accusers' aversion to cross-
examination is the lingering stress of victimization. Research indicates that
a high proportion of accusers who have suffered domestic violence and
sexual assault will continue to experience posttraumatic stress disorder at
the time of trial.36 The accuser must "relive" her victimization at trial.37 In
34. Immanuel Kant scorned utilitarianism, propounding instead a duty-based philosophy
of morality whereby an individual could never be a means to another end. Immanuel Kant,
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 96 (Allen W. Wood trans., Yale Univ. Press
2002) (1785).
35. The founding father of utilitarian philosophy was Jeremy Bentham, who insisted that
every proposal be judged according to the extent to which it advances aggregate societal
utility, with no concern for deontological theory. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation 11-12 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press
1996) (1823).
36. Nat'l Victim Ctr. & Crime Victims Research and Treatment Ctr., Med. Univ. of
South Carolina, Rape in America 7 (1992) [hereinafter Rape in America] (describing that a
four-year national study of rape victims found that thirty-one percent developed Post-
traumatic Stress Syndrome ("PTSD"), thirty percent experienced a major depression, thirty-
three percent had suicidal ideation, and thirteen percent actually attempted suicide); Deborah
Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims' Long-
Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y
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many cases, the trial is the accuser's first face-to-face encounter with the
assailant after the date of the offense. Some accusers may perceive cross-
examination by the defense as yet another attack by the defendant (through
the proxy of defense counsel). 38
Another circumstance exacerbating victims' plight at trial is a pervasive
sexist stereotype. Some jurors and judges believe that domestic violence is
a natural occurrence in families, 39 or that women who wear certain clothes
invite sexual assault, or that some women simply fabricate accusations of
rape.40 According to Professor Susan Estrich, herself a rape victim, "the
law's abhorrence of the rapist... has been matched only by its distrust of
the victim."41  People with very conservative morals may believe that a
woman with extensive sexual history would be unlikely to have withheld
consent on the night of the charged offense. Defense attorneys may attempt
to pander such biases in their cross-examination.42
& L. 465, 474 (2003) (citing studies indicating that forty percent of accusers in domestic
violence prosecutions suffer from PTSD, and eighty percent suffer from clinically
diagnosable depression); Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-911
World, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 167, 207-08 n.202 (2004) (collecting studies indicating that victims
of domestic violence suffer from PTSD).
37. Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin's Rape Shield Law:
Will Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1237, 1245 ("At trial, she
must relive the experience in front of a roomful of people consisting of friends, family,
strangers, authority figures, and, most significantly, her attacker."); James H. DiFonzo, In
Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 4 Hous. L. Rev. 1205, 1271 (2004)
(noting that rape prosecutions force victims to relive their truth); Epstein et al., supra note
36, at 475 ("Repeatedly coming to court or having to discuss the abuse to attorneys and
others may be very difficult for a victim who is trying to avoid thinking about the brutality
she has experienced.").
38. Psychiatrist Judith Herman put it aptly: "If one set out by design to devise a system
for provoking intrusive post-traumatic symptoms, one could not do better than a court of
law." Judith L. Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence 72 (1972).
39. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 3, 39-44
(1999) (discussing judges' and clerks' instinctive distrust of battered women, and proposing
judicial education to address this problem); Michelle Maxian, N.Y. City Legal Aid Soc'y,
Comments at the Brooklyn Law Review Symposium: Crawford v. Washington: The Future
of the Confrontation Clause in Light of its Past (Feb. 18, 2005) (transcript on file with
author) ("I would stand up [in domestic violence cases] and the judge would say to me, 'Are
they related?' And I would say, 'Yes.' And the judge would dismiss.").
40. John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 924a, at 736 (James H.
Chadborne ed., 1970) (suggesting that women tend to make up fantastic stories about rape,
and mental examinations are advisable in rape cases); Jennifer L. Hebert, Note, Mental
Health Records in Sexual Assault Cases: Striking a Balance to Ensure a Fair Trial for
Victims and Defendants, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1453, 1456-57 (2005) (discussing prejudices of
judges and jurors in rape prosecutions).
41. Susan Estrich, Real Rape 4 (1987).
42. Timothy Beneke, Men on Rape 104-05 (1982).
If I could get my client off by appealing to the jury's sexism I probably would,
because I'd be more concerned with this one guy and his freedom than the ethical
issue of sexism. If I didn't appeal to their sexism and I though I could've to get
my client off, and he went to prison, I probably would feel pretty bad about it.
Id. at 105.
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One other factor has vexed accusers for decades: the centrality of the
accuser's credibility to the government's case. In most prosecutions of
domestic violence or sexual assault, the key question is whether the jury
believes the accuser's or the defendant's version of the facts. The
prosecution rarely has the option of calling a third party who observed the
acts at issue in these prosecutions; 43 if such a witness had been present, the
case probably would not have proceeded to trial. Because the accuser's
credibility is the linchpin of the government's case, she can expect more
extensive cross-examination than an accuser would typically face in
prosecutions relying more heavily on physical evidence or third-party
witnesses.
The victim's prior relationship with the assailant also complicates
prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. Approximately
eighty percent of rape victims know their assailants. 44 Domestic violence,
by definition, involves an assault by a family member or intimate partner.
45
The accuser's prior familiarity with the accused makes trial especially
difficult, and creates pressures for the accuser to recant or refuse to
participate. These pressures do not exist to the same degree in prosecutions
of other violent crime, in large part because a much higher percentage of the
perpetrators are strangers.
Accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and rape also anguish over
the highly sensitive nature of impeachment material in those cases. While a
victim of a bar fight may face questions about his sobriety, and a victim of
armed robbery may be grilled about his inability to discern the features of
the masked robber, the victim of domestic violence or sexual assault faces
an altogether different category of impeachment. Her most private
affairs-including her past romantic relationships, her sexual mores, her
psychological fortitude, and her loyalty to family members-are possible
grounds on which to attack her credibility. 46 Cross-examination in these
cases is tantamount to public psychoanalysis.
43. Charlow, supra note 15, at 302 n.171 (noting that in rape cases, there are usually no
other witnesses beyond the alleged victim and the defendant); St. Joan, supra note 15, at 304
(stating that the accuser's credibility is crucial in domestic violence cases because there are
generally no witnesses other than the accuser and the accused).
44. Rape in America, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that among the non-stranger rapes, 11%
were committed by a father/stepfather, 9% by a husband/ex-husband, 16% by other relatives,
and 29% by nonrelatives).
45. See Epstein et al., supra note 36, at 479 (discussing victims' continuing emotional
attachment to batterers).
46. E.g., Wendy J. Murphy, Minimizing the Likelihood of Discovery of Victims'
Counseling Records and Other Personal Information in Criminal Cases: Massachusetts
Gives a Nod to a Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 983, 996-
1002 (1998) (discussing harm to accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual
assault when courts admit highly sensitive information for impeachment); Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan, Admitting Mental Health Evidence to Impeach the Credibility of a Sexual Assault
Complainant, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1373, 1388-97 (2005) (describing misuses of psychological
evidence in prosecutions of sexual assault).
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Over the last two decades, "no drop" policies in many prosecutors'
offices have added to victims' sense of frustration during cross-
examination. These policies require that prosecutors persist with certain
categories of cases even when victims urge the government to drop the
charges.47 Such policies cause a tense relationship between the prosecutor
and the victim, sometimes necessitating that the prosecution impeach its
own witness.48 Defendants, for their part, seek to exploit the fissures on the
government's side, and defense attorneys devote large portions of cross-
examination to exposing victims' vacillations. It is conceivable that the
victim could be declared hostile by both the government and the defendant,
and could be cross-examined vigorously by both.49
Any discussion of accusers' ordeals during cross-examination must
emphasize the heavy-handed tactics used by lawyers. The conventional
wisdom in the defense bar is that harsh cross-examination of accusers offers
the best-and perhaps the only-means of exonerating the accused.50
Prosecutors also have treated accusers in a callous manner.51  As the
prosecutor mentioned to the rape victim in the movie The Accused, "I'm not
a rape counselor. I'm a prosecutor." 52  Many prosecutors, fearing the
victims' potential recusal, come to regard accusers as saboteurs. 53 Few
other categories of accusers have such unpleasant relations with both
prosecutors and defense attorneys.
The foregoing summary has highlighted some of the factors that have
long exasperated accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual
assault. Against the backdrop of these longstanding difficulties the analysis
will now turn to more current trends.
47. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1865-71 (2002) (summarizing the evolution of "no-
drop" policies in the 1980s and 1990s); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated
Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1996)
(considering "no drop" policies within the framework of feminist theory).
48. Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 607 allows the impeachment of a witness by the
party calling the witness. Fed. R. Evid. 607.
49. FRE 611 authorizes the judge to allow cross-examination of a witness deemed
hostile, even if the party seeking to cross-examine the witness called the witness in the first
place. Fed. R. Evid. 611.
50. Taslitz, supra note 18, at 82-99 (analyzing defense attorneys' use of language in rape
trials).
51. Jennice Vilhauer, Understanding the Victim: A Guide to Aid in the Prosecution of
Domestic Violence, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 953, 962 (2000) ("The relationship between a
prosecutor and a victim often parallels that of the batterer and the victim.").
52. Stacy Caplow, Still in the Dark: Disappointing Images of Women Lawyers in the
Movies, 20 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 55, 69 (1999) (quoting The Accused (Paramount Pictures
1988)).
53. E.g., Laurence Busching, N.Y. City Law Dep't, Remarks at Brooklyn Law Review
Symposium: Crawford v. Washington: The Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of
Its Past (Feb. 18, 2005) (transcript on file with author) (stating his belief that domestic
violence victims usually try to sabotage the prosecution at trial); see infra Part IV.A
(suggesting that accusers retain independent counsel).
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS COMPOUNDING THE DIFFICULTY OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION
The last few years have seen an increase in the hardship experienced by
accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. This
phenomenon has two dimensions: First, the necessity for victims'
testimony at trial has grown; and second, the trauma of cross-examination
has increased. The following sections focus on some of the particular
factors that have brought about these changes.
A. Supreme Court Rulings in 2004-05
Three decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in a twelve-month period
have dramatically altered the procedural and evidentiary rules in criminal
trials. These cases are Crawford v. Washington,54 Blakely v. Washington,55
and United States v. Booker.56 All three opinions interpret the Sixth
Amendment to impose new duties on prosecutors--duties that carry
significant consequences for accusers as well.
1. Crawford
On March 8, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction of
Michael Crawford because the trial court in Washington State had admitted
hearsay statements by a declarant whom Crawford could not cross-examine.
The trial court had applied the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence to
conclude that the statement at issue-a declaration against interest by
Crawford's wife-was sufficiently reliable that it did not require further
testing by cross-examination. 57 Justice Scalia, writing for the Crawford
majority, insisted that cross-examination is necessary for any "testimonial"
hearsay statement offered against the accused. 58 The Crawford opinion did
not clearly explain the definition of "testimonial." This term seems to
encompass-more or less-statements made under circumstances that
would lead a reasonable declarant to foresee their later use in a criminal
prosecution. 59
The Crawford ruling is commendable from a doctrinal standpoint, but it
has hindered the prosecution of certain cases, especially cases involving
domestic violence.60 Approximately eighty percent of domestic violence
54. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
55. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
56. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
57. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
58. Id. at 68.
59. Id. at 51-52.
60. Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?: Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as
Judges Consider Which Evidence to Allow, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 22; Robin Franzen,
Ruling on Hearsay Evidence Hurts Cases: Prosecuting Abuse and Domestic Violence Will
be Harder After the Supreme Court's Affirmation of the Right to Face an Accuser, The
Oregonian (Portland), Mar. 11, 2004, at Al; David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme
Court Kills Evidence-Based Prosecution, Slate, Mar. 12, 2004,
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victims recant or refuse to cooperate after initially filing criminal
complaints.61 These victims change their stories for a variety of reasons:
economic dependence on the batterer, fear of reprisals, lack of confidence
in the criminal justice system, enduring affection for the defendant, or
perhaps the realization that the initial complaint was baseless. 62 Prior to
Crawford, prosecutors dealt with mercurial victims by offering their out-of-
court statements through various hearsay exceptions such as the excited
utterance exception, the exception for statements to medical personnel, and
specialized exceptions for domestic violence cases. 63
Crawford has constrained the use of such hearsay exceptions and
necessitated more testimony by accusers at trial. 64  According to the
majority opinion in Crawford, the government may not offer testimonial
hearsay against the defendant unless the declarant is available for cross-
examination at some point, either before or during trial.65 This Article's
http://www.slate.com/id/2097041. The survey of sixty-two prosecutors' offices in
California, Oregon, and Washington found that the Crawford decision significantly impeded
the prosecution of domestic violence in sixty-three percent of these jurisdictions. See infra
app. A (question 1).
61. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004); accord Douglas E. Beloof & Joel
Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic Violence
Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1, 3-4
(2002) (noting that eighty to ninety percent of domestic violence victims do not cooperate
with prosecutors); Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence
and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 359, 367 (1996)
(stating that victims' noncooperation rate in domestic violence prosecutions is between
eighty and ninety percent). In the present Article's survey of sixty-two prosecutors' offices,
ninety-one percent of respondents indicated that victims of domestic violence are likely to be
uncooperative when subpoenaed as witnesses in prosecutions of their assailants. See infra
app. A (question 13).
62. Epstein et al., supra note 36, at 476-82 (listing six "relational factors" that affect the
willingness of battered women to testify against their accusers); Lininger, supra note 28, at
769-70 (listing reasons why battered women recant or refuse to cooperate after initially
complaining to police).
63. Celeste E. Byrom, The Use of the Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception in the
Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After Crawford v. Washington, 24 Rev. Litig. 409,
416 (2005) (discussing the importance of the excited utterance exception in domestic
violence prosecutions before Crawford); Judges Amy Karan & David M. Gersten, Domestic
Violence Hearsay Exceptions in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, Juv. & Fam. Just.
Today, Summer 2004, at 20, 20-22 (noting that admission of hearsay evidence in domestic
violence cases was commonplace before Crawford); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence,
Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, Crim. Just., Summer 2005, at
24 (summarizing prosecutorial strategies in the era preceding Crawford).
64. For example, eighty-seven percent of respondents in the survey of prosecutors'
offices reported that they had greater difficulty introducing domestic violence victims'
hearsay statements to officers responding to the scene. See infra app. A (question 11).
65. Of course, the scope of the term "testimonial" is the crucial consideration here.
Some courts have found that the term testimonial excludes statements by victims in 911
calls, because the victims' primary concern is to summon help, not to launch criminal
prosecutions. E.g., People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 590 (Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875,
879-80 (Crim. Ct. 2004); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849 (Wash. 2005). Other courts have
found that victims' statements to police who have just arrived on the scene are not
testimonial, because the victims are too excited to consider the future prosecutorial use of
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recent survey of sixty-two prosecutors' offices in California, Oregon, and
Washington measured the effect of Crawford on prosecutors' trial strategies
in domestic violence cases. 66 Before Crawford, fifty-four percent of
respondents offered testimonial hearsay in more than half of all domestic
violence prosecutions. 67 After Crawford, this number shrunk to thirty-two
percent.68 The survey revealed that eighty percent of respondents were
more likely to call domestic violence victims as witnesses after Crawford. 69
Some anecdotal evidence indicated that prosecutors have begun
incarcerating victims on material witness warrants to ensure that they will
be available for trial as required by Crawford.70
Crawford has essentially made the victim's live testimony the sine qua
non of criminal prosecution, 71 and victims find their indispensable role
their statements, and/or the officers are more concerned with securing the scene than
gathering evidence. E.g., United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179-80 (1st Cir. 2005);
United States v. Brown, 322 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 n.4 (D. Mass. 2004); Hammon v. State,
829 N.E.2d 444, 452-53 (Ind. 2005); State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d. 208, 209-12 (Me. 2004);
State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). For an excellent article urging a
narrow construction of the term "testimonial," see Carol Chase, Is Crawford a "Get Out of
Jail Free" Card for Batterers and Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of
"Testimonial," 84 Or. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
66. The survey was conducted by telephone and e-mail from October 2004 through
January 2005. The complete set of questions appears in Appendix A. The questions were
posed to the lead domestic violence prosecutor in each jurisdiction, or, in the absence of such
a prosecutor, to the elected prosecutor or some other attorney with substantial involvement in
domestic violence cases. The survey elicited responses from twenty-three California
counties (which collectively included eighty-eight percent of California's population),
nineteen Oregon counties (which collectively included ninety-four percent of Oregon's
population), and twenty-two Washington counties (which collectively included ninety-six
percent of Washington's population).
67. See infra app. A (question 6).
68. See infra app. A (question 8).
69. See infra app. A (question 2).
70. For example, one respondent in the survey made the following comment:
The biggest impact we are having [as a result of Crawford] is that we are having to
arrest victims who do not appear after being served. We don't do it in all of our
cases, but we do it in the more serious cases. It is not something we want to do,
but we have decided that it is the better alternative to dismissal. Unfortunately,
some of the victims have had to remain in custody until the trial which is a
TERRIBLE message we are sending to the victim, her children, the defendant and
society. In the less serious cases we simply have had to dismiss them.
E-mail to Tom Lininger, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law
(Oct. 25, 2004, 10:34 PST) (on file with author) (response to survey on effects of Crawford).
The survey gave all respondents anonymity in order to encourage candor.
71. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (requiring an opportunity for cross-
examination if the government offers testimonial hearsay against the accused). Only where
the defendant has procured the victim's absence may the court admit testimonial hearsay
without some form of cross-examination. The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing
extinguishes the confrontation rights of a party that has, through wrongful conduct, procured
the unavailability of the hearsay declarant. This doctrine appears in FRE 804(b)(6), and a
growing number of states have codified the doctrine as well. E.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1350;
Del. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); Haw. R. Evid. 804(b)(7); 725 Il. Comp. Stat. 5/115-10.2(d) (1993);
Mich. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); N.D. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); Or. R. Evid. 804(1)(e); Penn. R. Evid.
804(b)(6); S.D. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a). Even in states without such a
provision, the doctrine may be available as a matter of common law. Reynolds v. United
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uncomfortable. Defendants and defense counsel are increasingly aware that
Crawford necessitates victims' live testimony. Because few trials can go
forward without the victims' testimony, the defense has an interest in
making cross-examination extremely unpleasant for the victim, in the hope
that she will lose interest in the case.72 Indeed, the Crawford ruling "scares
some victims from court" in domestic violence cases. 73 Statistical evidence
shows that dismissals rose in Dallas and in the three western states surveyed
when cross-examination became more harrowing as a result of Crawford.74
The turmoil in confrontation law engendered by Crawford has led
defendants to forego guilty pleas so that they can preserve appellate rights.
Most prosecutors require that a defendant give up the right to appeal when
he signs a plea agreement. That price is too high to pay for many
defendants, who would rather take their chances at trial and then gamble
that the evolving constitutional jurisprudence will furnish a winning
appellate argument. 75 In the survey of sixty-two prosecutors' offices, fifty-
nine percent indicated that defendants are less likely to plead guilty in
domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford.76 Of course, fewer pleas
mean more trials, and more trials mean more cross-examination of victims.
States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878) (cited with approval in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62). Some
commentators believe that forfeiture by wrongdoing is prevalent in cases involving violence
against women. Adam Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: Applying
Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, Prosecutor, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 14.
72. One of the reasons for the adoption of "no drop" policies in many jurisdictions was
to prevent defendants from bullying accusers into demanding that prosecutors drop the
charges. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1657, 1673 (noting that one purpose of "no
drop" policies is to "reduce batterers' attempts to intimidate or retaliate against victims to
keep them from proceeding"). When victims' hearsay was readily admissible, such
intimidation of accusers was fruitless, because the prosecution could go forward without the
victims' live testimony. Now the tighter confrontation requirements impede prosecutions
when the victims are absent. See infra app. A (question 3) (finding that seventy-six percent
of respondents indicated that they were more likely to dismiss domestic violence charges
when the victim is unavailable or refuses to cooperate). In effect, Crawford may have ended
the "no-drop" era in domestic violence prosecutions, and defendants may likely resume the
abusive practices that predated the adoption of "no drop" policies.
73. Robert Tharp, Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test: Ruling That Suspects Can
Confront Accusers Scares Some Victims From Court, Dallas Morning News, July 6, 2004, at
1A.
74. Id. (noting that in the summer of 2004, one half of domestic violence cases set for
trial in Dallas County were dismissed due to evidentiary problems attributed to Crawford).
The present Article's survey found that seventy-six percent of the responding prosecutors'
offices were more likely to dismiss domestic violence charges after Crawford when victims
were unavailable or reluctant to cooperate. See infra app. A (question 3).
75. Appeal waivers are "standard" and "nearly universal" in plea agreements. Alan J.
Chaset, Improving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Can We Get There From Here?,
Champion, June 2004, at 6, 8 & n.5. As will be discussed in Part V.I, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should prohibit prosecutors from requiring appeal waivers as a condition
for entering into plea agreements.
76. See infra app. A (question 4).
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2. Blakely and Booker
In Blakely v. Washington,77 the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
imposition of a statutory sentencing enhancement in a domestic violence
case because the prosecution had not proven the predicate facts to the jury,
as required by the Sixth Amendment. The Blakely majority made clear that
any fact forming the basis for an increase in the maximum sentence (other
than a prior conviction) requires a jury finding of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 78 In United States v. Booker,79 the Supreme Court took this analysis
one step further and held that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are
advisory rather than mandatory. 80
The Supreme Court's reformulation of sentencing law has set off a
reaction throughout the United States as courts and legislatures consider
new procedures to facilitate the required jury findings on sentencing issues.
Some states are simply enlarging the sentencing parameters in their
guidelines, so that judges will have more room to maneuver within these
boundaries absent a jury finding that changes the maximum sentence. 81
Some jurisdictions are bifurcating jury proceedings into a guilt phase and a
sentencing phase. 82 Other jurisdictions are requiring the prosecution to
prove the factual basis for sentencing enhancements at the same trial in
which the defendant is tried for the charged offense. 83
How have Blakely and Booker affected cross-examination in prosecutions
of domestic violence and sexual assault? To begin with, these decisions
make sentencing unpredictable, and they therefore make trials more likely.
77. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
78. Id. at 301-02; Stephen Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 333
(2004) (analyzing Blakely's implications, and proclaiming that this ruling was "the Court's
most earthshaking decision last Term").
79. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
80. id. at 750.
81. Alaska was one of the first states to take this approach after Blakely. Teri Cams,
Alaska Responses to the Blakely Case (July 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). As of October 2005, fourteen percent of jurisdictions with sentencing commissions
had responded to Blakely with a "substantive fix" (i.e., enlargement of sentencing ranges in
the guidelines grid). See infra app. B (question 5).
82. Kansas pioneered the bifurcated model after Blakely, and many other states have
followed suit. As of October 2005, twenty-seven percent of states with sentencing
commissions had responded to Blakely with a "procedural fix," that is, the submission of
certain sentencing issues to the jury, and among those states, eighty-three percent have
authorized bifurcated proceedings so that juries can consider the defendant's guilt or
innocence in the first phase, and then consider sentencing issues in the second phase. See
infra app. B (questions 5 and 6).
83. For example, Washington requires submission to the jury of sentencing issues that
could increase the defendants' maximum sentence, but bifurcated jury proceedings are not
used except in rare circumstances. Jason Amala & Jason Laurine, An Exceptional Case:
How Washington Should Amend Its Procedure for Imposing an Exceptional Sentencing in
Response to Blakely v. Washington, 28 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1121, 1129-39 (2005) (describing
the Washington Legislature's response to Blakely). As of October 2005, sixty-seven percent
of the states that responded to Blakely with a "procedural fix" instituted a new regime in
which prosecutors can prove sentencing issues to the jury at trial. See infra app. B (questions
5 and 6).
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Among jurisdictions with mandatory or presumptive sentencing guidelines,
seventy-eight percent of respondents to this Article's recent survey
indicated that the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and/or Booker have
created uncertainty about the sentence that a defendant could expect if he
took his case to trial. 84 The government's plea offers have become less
attractive, because the possible sentences that would result from a trial or a
plea are harder to predict and compare. 85 Further, this Article's survey
shows that defendants are reluctant to waive appellate rights as is customary
in a plea agreement, because defendants do not yet know how the dust will
settle after Blakely and Booker.86 In a speech on June 21, 2005, U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced that Blakely and Booker
could cause many more trials: "We risk a return to the pre-guidelines era,
when defendants were encouraged to 'play the odds' in our criminal justice
system, betting that the luck of the draw-the judge randomly assigned to
the case-might result in a lighter sentence. ' 87 U.S. attorneys and local
prosecutors echo this concern.88 As the number of trials increases, a larger
84. See infra app. B (question 3). Jurisdictions with mandatory or presumptive
sentencing guidelines include approximately twenty percent of the U.S. population. Among
jurisdictions with advisory sentencing guidelines, no respondents to this Article's survey
reported that Blakely or Booker increased the unpredictability of sentencing. See infra app. B
(question 3).
85. In his important book, Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in
America, George Fisher argues that the enticement for plea bargaining is the predictability of
sentencing, and that predictability depends in large part on the uniform application of
sentencing guidelines and statutory sentencing enhancements. George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining's Truth: A History of Plea Bargaining in America 223-29 (2003); see Alan Ellis
et al., Litigating in a Post-Booker World, A.B.A. Crim. Just. Mag., Spring 2005, at 24, 27
(noting that Booker decreases incentives for plea agreements because prosecutors have less
to offer); see also Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice:
A Three-State Study, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 885, 924 (2004) (noting that pleas are more likely
when prosecutors can offer a narrower range of possible sentencing outcomes compared to
post-trial sentencing); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as
Sentencers, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1211, 1259-60 (2004) (asserting that "the reality of the federal
system is that sentencing power in individual cases is overwhelmingly a function of the
prosecutor alone," due to operation of the sentencing guidelines and statutory sentencing
parameters before Blakely and Booker); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 1471, 1476 (1993) (noting that under the prior system,
prosecutors' control of the charge meant control of the sentence, which significantly
increased the likelihood of a plea). But see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The
Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1721, 1739-40, 1740 n.32 (2005)
(book review) (stating that Blakely and Booker will not necessarily result in increased
number of trials, because pressures to dispose of high volume of cases will remain; also, plea
rates have always been high even in states with indeterminate sentencing).
86. Among respondents in jurisdictions with mandatory or presumptive guidelines,
eighty-two percent indicated that appeals of sentences have increased after Blakely and
Booker. See infra app. B (question 4).
87. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm. ("We
risk a return to the pre-guidelines era, when defendants were encouraged to 'play the odds'
in our criminal justice system, betting that the luck of the draw-the judge randomly
assigned to the case-might result in a lighter sentence.").
88. E.g., E-mail from Joshua Marquis, Vice President, National Association of District
Attorneys, to Tom Lininger, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (Nov.
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number of victims must undergo cross-examination, especially now that
Crawford has made accusers virtually indispensable in criminal
prosecutions.
Not only do the new sentencing rules increase the likelihood of trial, but
they also necessitate victims' testimony on a wider range of issues. Before
the Supreme Court insisted that the jury make findings of fact to support
statutory sentencing enhancements, the prosecution typically submitted
these issues at a sentencing hearing in which the judge was the sole fact-
finder.89 The defendant generally had no confrontation rights in these
hearings.90 The rules of evidence usually did not apply. 91 The standard of
proof was lower than in a trial.92 Often the testimony of the victim was not
necessary at a sentencing hearing under the old rules, because hearsay was
much easier to admit than at trial.93 Blakely necessitates a more exacting
process for proving the predicate facts in order to seek a sentencing
enhancement. Basically, Blakely has lengthened the most difficult phase of
the proceeding for accusers-the portion in which accusers must testify
before the jury,94 subject to all the rules of evidence 95 and the rigorous
cross-examination allowed at trial.96
Prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault will definitely feel
the effect of the new sentencing regime, because many states have created
21, 2005, 09:02 PST) (on file with author) (stating that Blakely reduces incentives for guilty
pleas); M. Wood, Renewal of Sentencing Guidelines, Patriot Act Key for Prosecutors,
McNulty Says (Jan. 27, 2005),
http://www.law.virginia.eduthome2002/html/news/2005-spr/mcnulty.htm (reporting on
speech in which Paul McNulty, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, said that
Blakely and Booker "will make it difficult to convince defendants to plea bargain").
89. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1177-79 (2001) (noting that, as of 2001, judges were
generally the primary fact-finders in sentencing of noncapital cases).
90. Id. at 1178.
91. Fed. R. Evid. l101(d)(3) (stating that Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at
sentencing).
92. Bibas, supra note 89, at 1152-53 (noting that pre-Blakely, the standard of proof was
preponderance of the evidence).
93. For example, a police officer's testimony regarding a victim's excited utterance
would be a sufficient basis on which to impose a sentencing enhancement in the pre-
Crawford, pre-Blakely era. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2), 1101(d)(3).
94. Among respondents to this Article's survey, seventy-two percent believed that the
sentencing procedures necessitated by Blakely and/or Booker would lengthen the testimony
of accusers and victims before the jury, as compared with the period preceding June 2004.
See infra app. B (question 8).
95. This Article's survey found that among the states establishing bifurcated jury
proceedings in the wake of trial, fifty percent apply the state's evidence code to the jury
proceedings regarding sentencing issues. See infra app. B (question 7).
96. Courts are split as to whether Crawford applies at sentencing hearings. See Margaret
Paris, Crawford Symposium: Introduction, 20 Crim. Just. Mag., Summer 2005, at 5, 5
(noting ambiguity as to whether Crawford applies at sentencing). Compare United States v.
Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that Crawford does not apply to
sentencing hearings), with Desue v. State, 908 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(stating that Crawford does apply to sentencing hearings). In any event, many jurisdictions
are requiring submission of sentencing issues to juries during the underlying trial, and
Crawford certainly applies in that setting. See infra app. B (questions 5 and 6).
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special sentencing enhancements for such cases. The following factors
could form the basis for an increase in the maximum sentencing range: the
youth of the victim, the defendant's use of a weapon, the severity of injury
caused by the defendant, the defendant's deliberate cruelty or other
aggravating mental state, the pregnancy of the victim (whether preexisting
or caused by the defendant), the presence of a child witness, and the
defendant's recidivism. 97 Indeed, Blakely itself involved a sentencing
enhancement for "deliberate cruelty" in a domestic violence case. 98 Were
the Blakely case retried99 in Washington State under the new procedure
approved by the state's legislature in April 2005, a jury would need to hear
evidence regarding the defendant's "deliberate cruelty" and any other
sentencing enhancements at the same time that the jury adjudicated the
defendant's guilt or innocence-requiring more testimony at trial by every
witness (including the victim) whose evidence would be necessary to
support the sentencing enhancements.100
In sum, Blakely and Booker require accusers to work harder at trials and
sentencing hearings. Accusers will need to testify more often, and a higher
97. A number of recent law review articles have analyzed sentencing enhancements in
domestic violence prosecutions. E.g., Michelle Aulivola, Outing Domestic Violence, 42 Fam.
Ct. Rev. 162, 168 (2004) (noting enhancements for recidivism); Caroline Dettmer, Increased
Sentencing for Repeat Offenses of Domestic Violence in Ohio: Will This End the Suffering?,
73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 705, 706 (2004) (discussing enhanced sentences for recidivism); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(3) (2000) (providing for enhanced sentences in interstate domestic
violence cases where an assailant uses a weapon or causes severe injury); Leigh Goodman,
Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 93 Ky. L.J. 613, 628-29
(2005) (discussing enhancements based on the presence of children and a pattern of
recidivism). Recent articles have also analyzed sentencing enhancements in rape
prosecutions. E.g., Patricia Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for
Reform, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 131, 174-76, 183-84 (2002) (analyzing enhancements for the use of
drugs to accomplish sexual assault); Carol L. Gallery & Steven D. Pinkerton, Toward
Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 327, 328 (2004) (discussing
enhancements based on HIV exposure); Gregory A. McCarthy, Reforming Chapter 14 of
Arizona's Criminal Code: Bringing Consistency, Clarity, Contemporaneity, and
Constitutionality to Sexual Offense in Arizona, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 229, 231 n.12 (2001)
(discussing enhancements for extraordinary violence and recidivism); Michelle Oberman,
Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 8 DePaul J. Health
Care L. 109 (2004) (discussing sentencing enhancements based on the age of the victim);
Susan Purcell, The Evolution of Delaware Sex Crimes Legislation, 19 Del. Law., Summer
2001, at 8, 10 (reviewing sentencing enhancements based on the difference in age between
the assailant and victim); Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is
There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 Whittier L. Rev. 821, 866
(2004) (discussing enhancements based on HIV exposure).
98. Blakeley v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534-35 (2004). The defendant had
kidnapped his wife and forced her into a coffin-like box before transporting her a great
distance. Id.
99. The Blakely case actually did not require retrial because the defendant had entered a
guilty plea. Figure in Sentencing Case Gets 35 Years, Columbian (Vancouver, WA), Mar.
25, 2005, at C2.
100. As a result of Blakely and Washington's new Senate Bill 5477, the factual basis for
sentencing enhancements must be proven to the jury during the underlying trial, except in
very narrow circumstances. Amala & Laurine, supra note 83, at 1140-41.
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proportion of their testimony will be subject to the rules of evidence than in
the era before 2004.
B. Erosion of Evidentiary Privileges for Accusers
Several privileges that previously shielded accusers have become more
fragile in recent years. One example is the spousal testimonial privilege.
When applicable, this privilege allows a witness to refuse to testify against
her spouse. 101  Due to the complex psychological milieu in a domestic
violence case, many victims may wish to invoke this privilege when called
to testify against their spouses.' 0 2 Advocates of mandatory prosecution
have urged that the spousal testimonial privilege should not apply in
prosecutions of violence committed by one spouse against another. 10 3 This
proposal met with significant resistance in the 1990s, 104 but eventually
more and more states adopted domestic violence exceptions to the spousal
testimonial privilege, 105 and by 2005 such exceptions were universal. 10 6
Now a victim who has suffered domestic violence or rape at the hands of
her spouse may not decline to testify on the ground that she is married to
the defendant. 107
The privilege against self-incrimination has weakened as well. Victims
of domestic violence and sexual assault sometimes wish to "take the Fifth"
for a variety of reasons: They fear that their inconsistent statements over
101. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 13, § 5.31. In most states, the witness is the
holder of the privilege. Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century,
32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 137, 158 (2001) (noting that a majority of states with a spousal privilege
permit only the witness spouse to assert the privilege). In other words, the witness can elect
to testify whether or not her spouse approves. By contrast, the marital communication
privilege, which shields confidential communications between spouses during marriage, only
yields when both spouses approve disclosure.
102. Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or
Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 221-22 (1999) (noting that victims abused
by spouses would invoke the privilege if they could).
103. Renee L. Rold, All States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception Statutes, 55 J.
Mo. B. 249, 251-52 (1999) (explaining advantages and disadvantages of these statutes).
104. E.g., Anita K. Blair, Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to Testify
Against Their Will?, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 77.
"Mandatory waiver of spousal privilege goes too far. Advocates of mandatory
waiver aren't interested in victims' rights; if they were, they would respect a
woman's right to invoke her privilege not to testify .... A married woman who
wants to stay married might have many good reasons not to want to testify against
her husband."
Id.
105. Heather Fleniken Cochran, Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners: Some
Innovations in the Law of Evidence, 7 Tex. J. Women & L. 89, 97 (1997) (describing the
adoption of an exception by Texas in 1995); Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist
Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1032, 1054-58
(1996) (analyzing states' different approaches to spousal testimonial immunity in
prosecutions of crimes committed by one spouse against another).
106. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 609 n.550 (noting that by 2005, all states recognizing the
spousal testimonial privilege had created an exception for cases such as domestic violence in
which one spouse has committed a crime against the other).
107. Id.
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time may subject them to prosecution for perjury; 10 8 they fear that their own
violence against their assailants may amount to criminal conduct; 10 9 or they
have no valid basis for the privilege and are simply seeking to avoid
testifying on a particular issue. 110 Lately, victims find it more difficult to
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. In 2004, the Supreme Court
tightened the test for determining whether statements are truly self-
incriminating.'" 1  The new test requires a closer nexus between the
statement and the potential criminal liability of the speaker. 112 Further,
prosecutors are immunizing an increasing number of witnesses who would
otherwise take refuge under the Fifth Amendment. 113 Prosecutors realize
that immunizing these witnesses may be the only way to meet Crawford's
new confrontation requirements. 114  Thus the privilege against self-
incrimination currently offers less solace to victims than it has in the past.
108. Hollis L. Webster, Enforcement in Domestic Violence Cases, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J.
663, 678 n.94 (1995) (indicating that domestic violence victims sometimes claim the Fifth
Amendment privilege because they fear prosecution for changing their story).
109. John M. Burman, Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Raising the Standard of
Practice, 9 Mich. J. Gender & L. 207, 226 (2003) ("A victim of domestic violence may
resort to violence against a batterer to protect herself and/or her children from further
violence. Such actions may lead to criminal charges against the victim."); Webster, supra
note 108, at 678 n.94 (noting that a woman who has filed a domestic violence complaint
sometimes takes the Fifth by the time of trial, because she fears that her own conduct on the
date of the charged offense might be prosecuted as an assault).
110. H. Morley Swingle et al., Unhappy Families: Prosecuting and Defending Domestic
Violence Cases, 58 J. Mo. B. 220, 222 (2002) (noting that some domestic violence victims
refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination when there is simply no basis for the
privilege).
111. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
112. In Hiibel, a five-Justice majority stressed that the privilege against self-incrimination
only applies where "the danger to be apprehended [is] real and appreciable." Id. at 188-89
(citations omitted). Citing an 1896 opinion, the Hiibel majority indicated that the privilege
should not apply where "the answer of the witness will not directly show his infamy, but
only tend to disgrace him." Id. (citations omitted). Four Justices dissented, and one of them,
Justice Stevens, wrote separately to raise his concern that the Court's prior "cases have
afforded Fifth Amendment protection to statements that are 'incriminating' in a much
broader sense than the Court suggests. It has 'long been settled that [the Fifth
Amendment's] protection encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of
incriminating evidence even though the statements themselves are not incriminating ... 
Id. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
113. Jon S. Jackson, Counsel Should Provide More Fury, Less Nothing: 2004
Developments in Professional Responsibility, Army Law., May 2005, at 35 (referring to "the
recent explosion of cases involving testimonial immunity within the context of Crawford v.
Washington"); Mosteller, supra note 28, at 607 & n.539 (noting that prosecutors now have a
strong incentive to immunize witnesses because Crawford has put a premium on live
confrontation); e.g., Swingle et al., supra note 110, at 222 (stating that Missouri prosecutors
now have statutory power to immunize witnesses, and prosecutors are using this power to
immunize domestic violence victims who would otherwise take the Fifth at trial).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 871-73 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a
Crawford violation where the trial court prohibited the defense counsel from cross-
examining a prosecution witness concerning her inconsistent grand jury testimony; she
resisted this cross-examination by invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination).
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Of greater concern to victims is the privilege for psychiatric and
counseling records. Especially in a prosecution for acquaintance rape,
when the credibility of the accuser is crucial, a defense attorney will often
attempt to obtain psychiatric and counseling records for impeachment." 15
Some defense attorneys may seek these records not only for legitimate
purposes, but also to intimidate the accuser and discourage her from
pursuing the case. 1 16  While some states have created privileges for
counseling records, these privileges are riddled with exceptions based on
the defendants' need for impeachment material and the notion that accusers
put their mental health at issue when they file criminal complaints.1 1 7
Defendants now can gain access to accusers' counseling records more
easily than in the past. In fact, experts say that many prosecutors have
given up fighting requests for the accusers' counseling history. 118 The
result is devastating for victims.1 1 9 During cross-examination, they must
hear their most private and sensitive concerns repeated in open court. Many
victims become reluctant to speak with psychiatrists and counselors at all,
115. Gina McClard, the Associate Director of the National Crime Victim Law Institute in
Portland, Oregon, commented that "'[i]f you're a rape victim, more times than not the
defense will request your [counseling] records and get them."' Alison Stein Wellner, The
Startling New Defense Rapists are Using, Glamour, Nov. 2003, at 161 (quoting McClard);
see Wendy J. Murphy, Minimizing the Likelihood of Discovery of Victims' Counseling
Records and Other Personal Information in Criminal Cases: Massachusetts Gives a Nod to
a Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 983, 983 (1998) ("Over the
past decade, it has become increasingly common for defense counsel in criminal cases to
seek access to personal, confidential, and even privileged information of victims and
witnesses, including records of therapeutic counseling."); Jennifer L. Hebert, supra note 40,
at 1453 ("[R]equests for victims' mental health records in sexual assault cases are routine
practice.").
116. Hebert, supra note 40, at 1453. Wendy Murphy has argued that defense attorneys
threaten disclosure of victims' counseling records as "a subtle form of intimidation." See
Wellner, supra note 115, at 161.
117. Hebert, supra note 40, at 1468-71 (surveying states that allow disclosure of
counseling records after in camera review finds them to be material to defendants'
impeachment strategies); Adam Liptak, Privacy of Rape Accusers Clashes with Trial Rights,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2003, at A16 (noting that state statutes creating victim-counselor
privileges "often allow exceptions that make it hard for counseling centers to assure clients
that their confidences will never be revealed").
118. Tera Jckowski Peterson, Distrust and Discovery: The Impending Debacle in
Discovery of Rape Victims' Counseling Records in Utah, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 695, 698
("Although rape victims have been promised privacy in the information they disclose to
counselors, this information has become routinely disclosed to defendants."); Anne W.
Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary Rule: Dual Justifications for an
Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement
331, 332 (2005) (noting that practices of obtaining sexual assault victims' "therapeutic
records has become virtually routine"); Wellner, supra note 115 ("[E]xperts say the practice
[of requesting counseling records] has become so common that some prosecutors have given
up fighting it.").
119. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1375-76 (discussing the humiliation and
prejudice caused by admission of counseling records).
20051 1373
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
or they may try to avoid testifying in order to preserve the confidentiality of
their counseling records. 120
Rape shield laws have faltered over the last few years as well. These
laws exclude evidence of the accuser's prior "sexual behavior," subject to
certain exceptions. 121 Recently some appellate courts have interpreted the
term "sexual behavior" very restrictively, limiting the laws' effectiveness as
a safeguard for accusers' privacy. 122 Another recent trend is the increased
use of an exception in most states' rape shield laws that allows inquiry
about the accuser's sexual history in order to show that another person was
the source of bodily fluid or the cause of the injury at issue in the
prosecution. 123 The development of new technologies in forensic science
presents defendants with more opportunities to argue plausibly that another
man could have been the source of bodily fluid found on the alleged victim.
Indeed, it is quite common for a medical examination of an alleged rape
victim to discover trace amounts of semen from two men with distinct
DNA. 124 The defendant then may be able to convene a pretrial hearing in
which he may interrogate the accuser about her sexual involvement with
other men. 125 There is no guarantee that this hearing will generate any
evidence admissible under the rape shield laws, but the hearing will
certainly be traumatic for the accuser and invasive of her privacy.
Even the confidentiality of attorney-client communications has grown
more uncertain in the last few years. Victims of domestic violence and
sexual assault sometimes consult with lawyers to obtain restraining orders,
to dissolve their marriages, to gain custody of their children, to apply for
public benefits, to sue their assailants, or to defend against criminal charges
120. Hebert, supra note 40, at 1454-55 (noting that some victims "withdraw complaints to
maintain their privacy").
121. Fed. R. Evid. 412; 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal
Evidence T-46 to T-50 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997) (Table of State and
Military Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence) (listing state analogs of Rule 412).
122. E.g., Richardson v. State, 581 S.E.2d 528, 529-30 (Ga. 2003) (reversing the lower
court's application of a rape shield law to prevent disclosure of a victim's other
"relationship," without particular reference to "sexual aspects"); State v. Garron, 827 A.2d
243 (N.J. 2003) (reversing a conviction because the trial court relied on a rape shield law to
exclude evidence of accuser's prior flirtatious acts and speech); see also Lewis v. Wilkinson,
307 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 2002) (reversing the conviction because the trial court invoked a
rape shield law to exclude the accuser's diary entries referring generally to other
relationships). See generally Marah deMeule, Privacy Protections for the Rape
Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 145, 160-65 (2004) (surveying recent cases).
Justice Coleman, dissenting in the Garron case, condemned the majority's position as
"retrogressive," and declared that "[t]oday's decision essentially restricts our Rape Shield
Law to sexual assaults between victim and violent stranger, which translates into about
fifteen percent of rapes." Garron, 827 A.2d at 272-73 (citations omitted).
123. 6 Weinstein, supra note 121.
124. Kirk Johnson, The Bryant Trial: Anatomy of a Case That Fell Apart, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 3, 2004, at A14 (noting that the "discovery of semen from two men in a medical
examination of a rape victim is quite common" if the woman had sex recently before the
attack).
125. This occurred, for example, in the prosecution of Kobe Bryant. See infra Part II.C.
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that the victims themselves may face. 126 The confidentiality of these
attorney-client communications is increasingly at risk. In 2003 and 2004, a
majority of state bars adopted revisions to their ethical codes that included
important exceptions to lawyers' duties of confidentiality. 127 One new
provision suspends the confidentiality rules when clients have diminished
capacity and are at risk of harming their own interests; 128 conceivably, this
language could apply to the posttraumatic stress experienced by battered
women and rape victims. A second recent amendment allows lawyers to
breach confidentiality when necessary to comply with a statute such as a
"mandatory reporter" law, 129 so lawyers for battered women may end up
producing impeachment material when they detect that their clients are
perpetuating the cycle of violence. In addition, many states have adopted
rules allowing lawyers to disclose a client's intent to commit a fraud or
crime 13 0 -a provision that arguably applies when a client is prepared to tell
a different story in court than she told a police officer. Some defense
attorneys in rape cases have brazenly subpoenaed the victims' attorneys for
trial testimony, 131 sending a signal that the victims have nowhere to hide.
Summing up the foregoing analysis, the recent erosion of evidentiary
privileges compounds the trauma that accusers experience during cross-
examination in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. The
accusers dread their testimony more because of their greater vulnerability to
impeachment, their diminished protection from self-incrimination, and their
reduced privacy in their interaction with spouses, counselors, and
attorneys. 132
126. Burman, supra note 109, at 220-28 (listing various reasons why battered women
retain lawyers).
127. For a chart showing the states' different approaches to confidentiality, see John S.
Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes 107-14 (2005)
128. Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.14(c) (2003).
129. Id. R. 1.6(b)(6) (stating that lawyers may disclose confidential client information "to
comply with other law or a court order"). Some state statutes designate lawyers as
mandatory reporters. See Lisa Hansen, Attorneys' Duty to Report Child Abuse, 19 J. Am.
Acad. Matrimonial L. 59, 67-73 (2003). Even in states that exempt lawyers from
"mandatory reporter" laws, the confidentiality rules may not apply to evidence of severe
child abuse. Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the Model Rules authorizes lawyers to make disclosures where
necessary to "prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Model Rules of
Prof I Conduct R. 1.6(b)(1).
130. Dzienkowski, supra note 127, at 107-14; see also Nancy J. Moore, Revisions, Not
Revolution: Targeting Lawyer/Client Relations, Electronic Communications, Conflicts of
Interest ..., 88 A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 48, 50 (noting that the majority of state bar codes
authorize disclosures by lawyers to prevent clients' commission of any crime).
131. In a pretrial filing, Kobe Bryant's lawyers listed the accuser's personal attorney as a
defense witness. Charlie Brennan, Bryant Team Had 130 Witnesses Before Criminal Case
Evaporated, Rocky Mtn. News (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 9, 2004, at 16A.
132. Anita K. Blair believes that the erosion of privilege law will discourage reporting of
domestic violence. Blair, supra note 104, at 77 ("Welcome back to the bad old days, when
victims had to fear both their abusers and the system.").
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C. Fallout from Prosecutions of Kobe Bryant and Other Celebrities
In the last ten years, no case has more clearly illustrated-and
compounded-accusers' fear of cross-examination than the prosecution of
Kobe Bryant. The primary reason for the dismissal of the charges against
Bryant was the unwillingness of his accuser to face cross-examination at
trial. The tribulations suffered by Bryant's accuser have discouraged other
rape victims from seeking recourse through the criminal justice system. At
the same time, the Bryant case alerted men throughout the country that the
best defense to a charge of acquaintance rape is an aggressive campaign to
discredit the accuser.
The true facts of the Bryant case may never be known, but some facts are
beyond dispute. On June 30, 2003, a nineteen-year-old female hotel worker
went with National Basketball Association star Kobe Bryant to his hotel
room in Eagle, Colorado. Bryant had sexual intercourse with this woman.
She would later claim that he raped her, and he would insist that the sex
was consensual. The physical evidence confirmed that the two had sexual
intercourse, but the forensic scientists could not determine conclusively
whether the sex had been consensual. There were only two eyewitnesses to
the encounter in the hotel room: Bryant and the accuser. 133
Bryant's lawyers readied a barrage of impeachment material to use
against the accuser if the case proceeded to trial. The defense attorneys
announced that they would present the following evidence to undermine the
accusers' credibility: testimony that she had been drinking and cavorting
with friends around the time of the alleged rape; evidence that she had filed
a parallel civil suit against Bryant; evidence that her mental health was frail;
evidence that she had sought counseling; evidence that she had discussed
her encounter with Bryant without showing signs of trauma; and evidence
that she had sexual relations with at least one other man around the time of
the alleged rape by Bryant. 134 The defense team left no doubt that its
strategy would be "an aggressive attack on [the accuser's] credibility and
morality."1 35
In pretrial hearings, U.S. District Court Judge Terry Ruckriegle ruled that
the defense could admit much of this evidence at trial, including evidence
of the accuser's sexual relations with other men during a seventy-two-hour
133. For a summary of the basic facts in the Bryant case, see Harden, supra note 32, at
A8; Johnson, supra note 124, at A14.
134. The following articles discuss the impeachment material that defense counsel was
prepared to use in the Bryant case: Harden, supra note 32; Steve Henson, Bryant's Accuser
Required to Testify, L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 2004, at D3; Johnson, supra note 124; Tom
Kenworthy, Lawyers Mount a Legal Offensive in Bryant's Defense, U.S.A. Today, Jan. 26,
2004, at 1lA; T.R. Reid, Accuser's Appearance Delayed in Bryant Case: Judge
Reconsiders Ruling on Questions About Woman's Sexual and Psychological History, Wash.
Post, Mar. 2, 2004, at A3; Martha Neil, Bryant Case Leads to Calls for Change in Rape-
Shield Laws, A.B.A. J. E-Rep., Aug. 6, 2004.
135. Reid, supra note 134.
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period surrounding the alleged crime. 136 Bryant's attorney Pamela Mackey
punctuated the pretrial proceedings by repeatedly naming Bryant's accuser
in open court, even though a court order prevented disclosure of her
identity.137
The media shone a bright spotlight on the Bryant prosecution. The
mainstream media refused to disclose the accuser's name, but internet sites
and one talk show host delighted in revealing her identity. 138 When a court
clerk inadvertently e-mailed transcripts of an in camera hearing to seven
newspapers, 139 the district court issued an order prohibiting publication of
the transcripts, but the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the newspapers'
right to publish this information. 140 The district court staff also made other
inadvertent disclosures that leaked sensitive information to the media
regarding the accuser's identity and history.141
Two days before jury selection was to begin, the prosecution arranged a
mock trial in which the accuser would face a simulated cross-
examination. 142 The purpose of this exercise was to prepare the accuser for
the rigors of trial. A prosecutor from another county played the role of
Pamela Mackey, mimicking the aggressive tone that Mackey had used in
pretrial hearings. The prosecutor playing Mackey tried to be "as harsh as
Mackey would have been."143 This attorney asked questions based on the
impeachment strategies that the defense had mapped out in pretrial filings
and hearings. The interrogation lasted three hours. The accuser found this
mock cross-examination to be devastating. "She was literally cut open,"
commented a prosecutor who was present. "The mock exam was a big
turning point for her." 144
In fact, this rehearsal was the cause of the demise of the Bryant
prosecution. Within just a few hours after the simulated cross-examination,
the accuser told her legal team that she would withdraw as a witness if
136. Tom Kenworthy & Patrick O'Driscoll, Judge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case, U.S.A.
Today, Sept. 2, 2004, at Al.
137. Kenworthy, supra note 134. Bryant's attorney Patricia Mackey would later claim
that these repeated references were inadvertent.
138. Kate Zernike, What Privacy? Everything Else But the Name, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3,
2003, at D4.
139. Neil, supra note 134.
140. People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 627, 644 (Colo. 2004) (overruling the trial court's
attempt to protect accusers' sexual history from disclosure).
141. Amazingly, the court staff mistakenly revealed sensitive information about the
accuser on a number of occasions. In September 2003, the court website posted the alleged
victim's name. Further, one month after the accidental disclosure of the transcripts from the
in camera hearings, court staff inadvertently posted a confidential order that revealed the
accuser's name along with previously undisclosed DNA evidence. Jeffrey Matrullo, People
v. Bryant and Prior Restraint: The Unsettling of a Settled Area of Law, 4 Conn. Pub. Int.
L.J. 347, 350 n.18 (2005). Court staff revealed sealed information to the public a total of
four times. Jeff Benedict & Steve Henson, The Case Against Kobe Bryant Unraveled in a
Mock Trial, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 2004, at Al.
142. Benedict & Henson, supra note 141, at Al.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Bryant would simply apologize. The accuser's personal attorney, John
Clune, would later recount that his client was fully committed to
participating in the prosecution up until the time of the mock examination.
According to Clune, the simulated cross-examination pushed her over the
edge and convinced her not to testify at trial. 145
A week after the mock cross-examination, District Attorney Mark
Hurlbert announced that the prosecution would dismiss the charges against
Bryant. "[T]he victim has informed us after much of her own labored
deliberation that she does not want to proceed with this trial. For this
reason, and this reason only, I am dismissing this case." 146
Whether Kobe Bryant did or did not rape the accuser in Eagle, Colorado,
there can be little doubt that this case had a significant effect on women's
perception of the criminal justice system. Millions of women saw Bryant's
accuser endure a long ordeal only to withdraw from the criminal
prosecution. Victims' advocates called the trial a huge setback, and
anecdotal evidence indicated that reporting of rape declined in some
areas. 147
On the other hand, millions of men and defense attorneys saw that a
strategy of "trying the accuser" pays big dividends in a rape prosecution.
The Bryant case exposed the weakness of rape shield laws and other
privileges that might have thwarted such a strategy if vigorously
enforced. 148 Bryant's defense case gave new life to myths about accusers'
mendacity and promiscuity. As one former prosecutor editorialized in the
Washington Post, "[M]ost of these rape myths had gone underground,
seemingly because it would have been unpopular to express them. But
now, distressingly, the Kobe Bryant case has granted them all permission to
resurface." 149
The Bryant case is not the only recent prosecution that has demonstrated
the strategic value of vilifying the accuser. The successful defenses of
William Kennedy Smith, 150 Mark Chmura, 151 and Michael Jackson 152 all
145. Id.
146. Kenworthy & O'Driscoll, supra note 136.
147. For examples of areas in which the reporting of rape to law enforcement has
decreased in the wake of the Bryant case, see supra note 32. Eagle County District Attorney
Mark Hurlbert noted that "[t]his kind of thing creates a chilling effect for other victims....
The fear is that a rape victim would choose not to report it if they're going to be drug [sic]
through the mud like this." Reid, supra note 134.
148. According to prominent defense attorney Laurie Levenson, the Bryant case
"show[ed] the public that rape-shield laws are not absolute barriers to exposing an accuser's
sexual past." Claire Luna, Law No Shield in Rape Trials, L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 2004, at B1.
149. Alice Vachss, Op-Ed, The Charge of Rape, the Force of Myth, Wash. Post, Nov. 2,
2003, at B2.
150. William Kennedy Smith is the nephew of U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy. The defense
of Smith by noted attorney Roy Black is summarized in Taslitz, supra note 18, at 82-97. See
also Gregory M. Matoseian, Language, Law, and Society: Policy Implications of the
Kennedy Smith Rape Trial, 29 Law & Soc'y Rev. 669 (1995).
151. Mark Chmura played football for the Green Bay Packers. Tom Kertscher, Experts
Worry Some Rape Victims May Not Speak Out Now; Chmura Verdicts, Cross-Examination
Send Message, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Feb. 6, 2001, at I1A.
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relied heavily on such tactics. Indeed, it is hard to think of a recent high-
profile case in which the prosecution has overcome this strategy. The old
adage is true: The best defense is a good offense.
D. Increasing Sentences and Their Effects on Trial Tactics
Sentences for domestic violence have grown steadily. 153 In 2005, a
survey of state sentencing commissions found that a majority of responding
jurisdictions had seen an increase in statutory sentencing ranges for
batterers over the prior five years. 154 One reason for the increase is the
proliferation of statutes that convert domestic violence from a misdemeanor
to a felony under certain circumstances, such as when the victim is
pregnant, the offender carries a gun, or a minor child witnesses the
incident.155 Another reason for the increased punishment is courts' greater
appreciation for the urgency of protecting battered women and children. 156
Sentences for rape have risen as well. The 2005 survey of state
sentencing commissions found evidence of this trend.' 57 In addition, data
released by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics show a long-term increase
in the prison time served by convicted rapists. The average time served for
152. John M. Broder & Nick Madigan, Jackson Cleared After 14-Week Child Molestation
Trial, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2005, at Al.
153. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 748 (2005) (noting
a recent increase in penalties for domestic violence, among other offenses, and noting that
the majority opinion in the U.S. supports this increase); see John M. Darley, On the Unlikely
Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. &
Pol'y 189, 189 (2005) (noting across-the-board trend toward higher sentences in the U.S.).
154. See infra app. B (question 3).
155. Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 321, 374
n.340 (2003) ("[S]tates are increasingly authorizing or mandating significantly enhanced
criminal penalties for domestic violence committed in the presence of children."); Family
Violence Prevention Fund, The Case for Violence Prevention,
http://endabuse.org/programs/display.php3?DoclD=224 (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). The
Family Prevention site notes that
[a]t least eleven states have enacted some form of enhanced penalty relating to
criminal punishment when children are exposed to domestic violence. This is
most often done by establishing separate criminal charges in addition to domestic
violence charges, making exposing a child to domestic violence a felony rather
than a misdemeanor, and increasing prison sentences for these perpetrators.
Id.; e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(C) (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-702(c)(17)
(Supp. 2005); Cal. Penal Code § 1170.76 (West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 921.0014,
921.0024(1)(b) (West 2001); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-606.4(1)(c) (2004); Idaho Code Ann. §
18-918(7)(b) (2004); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 644 (West Supp. 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. §
163.160(3)(c) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (2003); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9.94A.535(3)(h)(ii) (West 2001).
156. Decades ago, courts were reluctant to impose any significant punishment on
convicted batterers. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the
Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 1657, 1663 n.26 (describing courts'
prior unwillingness to sentence batterers to incarceration). Now courts impose substantial
sentences on defendants convicted of family violence. Matthew R. Durose et al., supra note
16, at 50 (noting that among defendants convicted of family assault in state courts of eleven
large counties, 58.9% went to local jails, and their mean sentence was almost seven months;
27.4% went to state prisons, and their mean sentence was 38.3 months).
157. See infra app. B (question 1).
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rape in 1983 was 46.9 months (less than four years). 158 By the mid-1990s,
convicted rapists typically served approximately sixty months (five
years). 159 In 2002, the most recent year for which data is available, the
average time served on a rape conviction was ninety months (seven and a
half years). 160
The foregoing data reflect state court sentencing. When one takes
account of the rise in federal prosecution of violence against women,
defendants' sentencing exposure for these crimes has increased
considerably. Federal prosecutions have risen by over one hundred percent
in recent years. 161 Federal sentences are significantly higher than state
sentences, and there is no possibility of parole in the federal system.162
How does increased sentencing exposure affect cross-examination of
accusers? It is axiomatic that cross-examination becomes more grueling
when potential punishments increase. As Professor Roger Crampton has
observed, "Hyper-adversarialism prevails in high-stakes cases." 163
Certainly a defendant who faces a misdemeanor charge of domestic
violence, with virtually no possibility of incarceration, will take cross-
examination of the accuser less seriously than a defendant who faces a
felony charge of domestic violence. Indeed, when the federal government
began prosecuting gun possession by defendants who had previous
misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence, these defendants
complained that they did not take their trial rights seriously in the
misdemeanor cases because of the negligible consequences. 164 The higher
the sentence, the greater the defendants' desperation-and desperate
defendants ask tougher questions on cross-examination.
E. Higher Numbers of Non-English-Speaking Victims
The percentage of U.S. residents whose primary language is not English
has steadily risen. Nearly one in five U.S. residents does not speak English
158. Patrick A. Langan & David P. Farrington, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime and Justice in
the United States and in England and Wales, 1981-96, No. NCJ 169284, 77 app. 1, fig.56
(1998).
159. Id.; see also Protection from Sexual Predators Act of 1997, H.R. 305, 105th Cong. §
2(a)(3) (1997) (declaring a congressional finding that the average time served for a state
prison sentence for rape is five years).
160. Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, U.S. Dep't of Justice, State Court
Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2002, No. NCJ 208910, tbl. 1.5 (2005).
161. Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 Hastings L.J. 525, 531-32
(2003) (noting increased numbers of defendants charged under the Violence Against Women
Act's provisions regarding gun crimes by domestic abusers); Durose et al., supra note 16, at
51 (reporting that 757 suspects were referred to U.S. attorneys' offices for prosecution under
federal domestic violence laws from 2000 to 2002).
162. Durose et al., supra note 16, at 50-52 (showing that federal sentences for domestic
violence offenses far exceed state sentences).
163. Robert C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and
Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1599, 1608 (2002).
164. Lininger, supra note 161, at 585-93.
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in the home-up almost thirty percent since the 1990s. 165 The 2000 Census
showed that in eight states, over twenty-five percent of the population
speaks a language other than English in the home. 166 The 2000 Census also
revealed that twenty-one million U.S. residents-or nine percent of the total
population-admitted some difficulty speaking English.' 67 These figures
probably underestimate the numbers of U.S. residents who have trouble
with English, because the Census Bureau typically undercounts non-English
speakers. All the available evidence suggests that the proportion of non-
English speakers in the U.S. will grow considerably in the coming
decades. 168
Concomitantly with their growth as a proportion of the U.S. population,
an increasing number of non-English speakers are appearing in court as
accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. The U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics found that crime rates in the non-English-
speaking population are approximately equal to those in the English-
speaking population, 169 but the changes in the ratio of non-English speakers
to English speakers means that a higher proportion of accusers do not speak
English.
Cross-examination is more difficult for witnesses lacking facility in
English. Translators may not be able to convey precisely the meaning of
the attorney's question or the response by the witness,1 70 causing friction
during the examination. Witnesses other than parties generally lack
translators at any time prior to their testimony, so they may be less prepared
165. Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use and English-
Speaking Ability: 2000, Series C2KBR-29, at 2 (2003).
166. Id. at5.
167. Id. at4.
168. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Resident Population-Selected Characteristics, 1790
to 1999, and Projections 2000 to 2050, in Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000
(2001).
169. While no data set is available that focuses solely on non-English speakers, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics has collected data comparing the incidence of family and
intimate violence among the Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations in the U.S., and there is
no significant difference on a per capita basis. Durose et al., supra note 16, at 10 (breaking
down data into various demographic categories); Callie Marie Rennison, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Hispanic Victims of Violent Crime, 1993-2000, No. NCJ 191208, at 6 (2002)
(showing rates of victimization among the Hispanic population in the U.S.). But see Mary
Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Service Needs
of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal Help and Policy Implications, 7 Geo. J. on Poverty L.
& Pol'y 245, 250 (2000) (indicating that thirty-four percent of immigrant Latinas
experienced domestic violence).
170. Daniel J. Rearick, Reaching Out to the Most Insular Minorities: A Proposal for
Improving Latino Access to the American Legal System, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 543,
577 n.184 (2004) (listing common problems that arise in interpretation, including omission,
addition, substitution, and condensation).
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for court than English speakers. 171 In addition, cultural differences may
heighten these accusers' sense of alienation during cross-examination. 172
F. Greater Media Coverage of Trials
The last few years have seen an increase in both the frequency and
intensity of media coverage in prosecutions of sexual assault and domestic
violence. 173 Not only in celebrity prosecutions, but also in lower-profile
cases, newspapers are litigating to require that courts disclose sensitive
information about accusers. 174 Certain echelons of the media, such as
internet news sites and radio talk shows, show little compunction about
publishing the accusers' identities and other sensitive information. 175 Even
when television footage of a trial conceals the accuser's face, her identity is
easy to discover through other media. Professor Susan Estrich put it
bluntly: "Anonymity is, you have to go online or listen to the radio to find
out a person's name as opposed to just turning on the TV."' 176
The relentless media coverage of rape prosecutions tends to focus on the
part of the trial that is most embarrassing for the accuser: cross-
examination. Who can forget the scathing cross-examination of the accuser
in the rape prosecution of William Kennedy Smith? In the television
footage, an opaque screen (inserted in the editing room) prevented viewers
from seeing her face. Yet the accuser's frequent breakdowns and halting
responses to defense attorney Roy Black's questions left no doubt about her
171. Id. at 552-57 (explaining the great need for interpreters before non-English speakers
appear in court).
172. Nimish R. Ganatra, The Cultural Dynamic in Domestic Violence: Understanding
the Additional Burdens Battered Immigrant Women of Color Face in the United States, 2
J.L. Soc'y 109, 110 (2001) (detailing the hardship faced by immigrant victims of domestic
violence, including language and cultural differences that complicate their involvement in
prosecutions of their assailants); John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants: Learning
from Ten Years of Experience in Family Courts, 44 Judges' J. 24, 25 (2005) ("Some non-
English speakers are completely intimidated by the court system, having come from
countries with very different legal and judicial traditions.").
173. Marah deMeule, supra note 122, at 146 ("Advances in communications technology
leave some rape complainants stripped of virtually all privacy."); Megan Reidy, The Impact
of Media Coverage on Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a
"Fair Trial"?, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 297, 319-20 (2004) (analyzing the increasing media
coverage of rape trials and the increasing invasion of victims' privacy).
174. E.g., People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo. 2004) (overruling the trial court's
attempt to protect accusers' sexual history from disclosure); Times Publ'g Co. v. State, 903
So. 2d 322, 325-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (overturning the lower court's refusal to grant
media access to records concerning the young victim in a rape/murder case); Matrullo, supra
note 141, at 347-48 (noting the media's zeal in challenging court orders limiting the release
of information in rape trials).
175. Thomas B. Kelley, Oh No! Here Comes Another Celebrity Rape Trial!, Comm.
Law., Spring 2004, at 2 (discussing the dissemination of information about Kobe Bryant's
accuser on the Internet); Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed, Rethinking the Rape Shield, Boston Globe,
July 31, 2003, at A15 (stating that as a result of easy access to information about accusers on
the internet, on talk radio, and in supermarket tabloids, rape shield laws offer "little more
protection in rough weather than a mesh raincoat").
176. Zernike, supra note 138.
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agony during cross-examination. 177 Smith's accuser eventually gave up
trying to protect her privacy after several newspapers revealed her name. 178
She described the media coverage as "inhuman" treatment. 179  More
recently, Kobe Bryant's accuser cited fears about media coverage of her
cross-examination as one of the reasons why she could not bear to
participate in a trial. 180
Throughout the nation, the fear of publicized cross-examination during
rape prosecutions seems to be growing. In June 2005, the U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics released survey data showing that an increasing proportion
of non-complaining rape victims explained their decision not to report by
citing concerns about their privacy. 181
Even complainants who give confidential tips to the media may not be
able to protect their privacy. A growing number of prosecutors, criminal
defense attorneys, and civil attorneys are seeking to compel reporters'
revelation of informants' tips. 182 For example, Alabama football coach
Mike Price was able to overcome a reporter's shield law to learn about
information provided by a woman who accused him of sexual
improprieties. 183 Media advocates are lobbying Congress to pass new
shield laws for reporters, but as of July 2005 these efforts have been
unavailing.184
177. ABC News/MPI Home Video markets a fifty-minute-long videocassette with
extensive excerpts from the cross-examination of William Kennedy Smith.
178. Smith's accuser gave a televised interview in 1992 after newspapers began
publishing her name, and she also gave televised interviews in 2004 to express her concerns
about the publicity surrounding the prosecution of Kobe Bryant. Today (NBC Television
broadcast Apr. 22, 2004) (transcript available at 2004 WL 56561508).
179. She made these remarks in a speech at Stanford University on April 13, 1992. News
Release, Stanford University, Bowman Lambastes Media for Invading Her Privacy (Apr. 15,
1992), available at www.stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/92/920415Arc2287.html.
180. Benedict & Henson, supra note 141.
181. See supra note3l.
182. According to Professor Geoffrey Stone at the University of Chicago Law School,
these assaults on the confidentiality of reporters' sources are a relatively recent phenomenon.
In the recent past, "prosecutors did not subpoena journalists because of their respect for the
freedom of the press. ... What we face today is a serious anomaly in our history and one in
which Congress should address." Kirsten B. Mitchell, Senate Panel Implored to Advance
Reporters' Shield Bill, News Media Update, July 20, 2005,
http://www.rcfp.org/news/2005/0720-con-senate.html (quoting Professor Stone). Of course,
the most conspicuous recent example is the federal government's compulsion of a New York
Times reporter to name the government source that revealed Valerie Plame was an
undercover Central Intelligence Agency agent. Bay Fang, A Murky Case Takes a Bizarre
Twist, U.S. News & World Rep., July 18, 2005, at 56.
183. Price v. Time, Inc. 416 F.3d 1327, 1335-48 (lth Cir. 2005) (overruling the
defendant's objections based on a state law shielding reporters' sources and the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); R. Robin McDonald, SI Ruling Puts Pressure on
Media Attorneys, Legal Intelligencer, July 20, 2005, at 4 (noting that former University of
Alabama football coach Mike Price is "just four depositions away from securing the
identities of anonymous sources whose descriptions in Sports Illustrated of his alleged
sexual escapades preceded his 2003 firing").
184. Geneva Overholser, Shield Law for Reporters?, Wash. Post Live Discussion, July
20, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/discussion/2005/07/19/DI2005071900937.html.
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One thing is certain: Accusers in prosecutions of sexual assault and
domestic violence are increasingly worried that a potentially large audience
could learn of the accusers' involvement in rape trials. Categories of
information that were inaccessible to the public decades ago are now only a
few Google clicks away.
G. Ironic Influence of Victims' Rights Movement
The victims' rights movement has gained momentum in recent years, and
has effected major legislative and constitutional changes in most states.
While many of the reforms have benefited all victims, some of the new
rules have actually caused hardship for victims of domestic violence and
sexual assault. To understand these unintended consequences, it is
necessary first to discern the disparate interests within the victims' rights
movement.
The movement's primary spokespersons are relatives of children who
have been murdered or kidnapped. Prominent examples include Mark
Klaas in California, Betty Jane Spencer in Indiana, Bob Kouns in Oregon,
and Roberta and Vince Roper in Maryland. 185 John Gillis, the current
director of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime
("OVC"), lost his young daughter in a gang-related shooting. 186 These
parents deserve commendation for sharing their experience with the nation,
and for urging policy reforms in order to spare other families the grief that
they have suffered. Yet these leaders' interests do not always align with the
interests of accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual
assault. The leadership of the victims' rights movement is concerned that
courts do not give victims and their families enough opportunity to testify
during criminal prosecutions. 187 The movement's leaders have little reason
185. For information about the Klaas family, see http://www.klaaskids.org (last visited
Oct. 24, 2005). For information about the late Betty Jane Spencer, see the tribute posted on
the Office for Victims of Crime ("OVC") website, found at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/tributes.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). For
information about the late Bob Kouns, the "father of victims' rights in Oregon," see the
tribute to him posted on the website of Oregon Crime Victims United,
http://www.cimevictimsunited.org/news/2005/hcr1l.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). I had
the privilege of meeting Mr. Kouns while he was alive, and I respect him tremendously. For
information about Roberta and Vince Roper, founders of the Maryland Crime Victims'
Resource Center, see http://www.mdcrimevictims.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2005). All of
these leaders lost children to violent crimes committed by strangers.
186. Director John W. Gillis discussed his background, and the tragedy involving his
daughter, in a speech on April 19, 2002. The text of this speech is available on the OVC
website at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/041902.htm.
187. Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements:
Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 492, 508 (2004)
(stating that victims' rights organizations seek reforms that give victims a greater
opportunity to express their views in criminal prosecutions); Liesa L. Richter, Evidence: Is
Oklahoma Balancing the Scales of Justice by Tying the Hands of Trial Judges?: The 2002
Amendment to Section 2403 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code Mandating Admission of In-
Life Victim Photographs in Homicide Cases, 56 Okla. L. Rev. 383, 406 (2003) (stating that
across the country, "victims rights groups have become increasingly concerned with the
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to fear impeachment during their testimony: They generally do not have
credibility problems, and they are aware that defense counsel would only
alienate jurors by embarrassing the grieving parents of murdered or
abducted children. The leaders of the victims' rights movement usually had
no prior acquaintance with the criminals who abducted or killed their
children. 188 For the most part, these leaders were not percipient witnesses
to the crime itself, so they find themselves "on the outside looking in"
during criminal prosecutions. They must advocate vociferously to secure
their place on the witness roster.
By contrast, victims of domestic violence and sexual assault often face a
unique set of challenges. 189 They are vulnerable to impeachment on highly
personal matters. They frequently have a longstanding relationship with-
and continued economic dependence upon-the accused. Victims of
domestic violence and sexual assault may not even wish to continue with
the prosecution of the defendants.' 90 These victims are not clamoring to
make their voices heard in a legal system that would otherwise ignore them:
Quite to the contrary, these victims are already among the central actors in
the courtroom drama. Herein lies the major difference that distinguishes the
leadership of the victims' rights movement from victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault. The leadership seeks more opportunities for
victims to testify, while many victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault are trying to hide from the spotlight.
Recent initiatives propounded by the victims' rights movement have
tended to advance the former interest at the expense of the latter. In a
majority of states, victims' groups have demanded the interjection of more
victim testimony in criminal prosecutions. 191 Not only does the victims'
rights movement seek more involvement by victims at trials, but also at plea
hearings and sentencing hearings. This reform is not necessarily a welcome
development for reticent victims of domestic violence and sexual assault.
voice of the victim in recent years"); Alice Koskela, Comment, Victim's Rights
Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34
Idaho L. Rev. 157, 163 (1997) (stating that "[t]he aim of the victim's rights movement has
been to give victims a 'voice' in the process").
188. Erin Ann O'Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & Pol'y 229,
243 (2005) ("Victims of violent crimes perpetrated by strangers are the most effective
spokespeople for the movement.").
189. See supra Part I.
190. Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 645, 655 n.43
(2003) (noting that the goal of the victims' rights movement to give "victim[s] a 'voice"'
may be inconsistent with the interests of battered women subpoenaed to testify in
prosecutions of which they disapprove).
191. See State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 761 n.6 (Utah 2002) ("Responding to [the victims'
rights] movement, many legislatures across the country enacted statutes affording victims a
voice at critical stages of the criminal justice process."); O'Hara, supra note 188, at 241
(noting that thirty-two states have victims' rights amendments, and other states have enacted
legislation to address victims' rights). For a state-by-state analysis of measures that create
more junctures for victims' testimony, see
http://crime.about.com/od/victimsrightsbystate/#more (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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Crawford makes cross-examination grueling at trial, 192 and Blakely has
spurred legislative reforms that apply the rules of evidence in many
sentencing proceedings. 193 There surely are some victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault who wish to offer additional testimony, but a
substantial number of these victims would prefer not to lengthen their time
on the witness stand. 194
Another reform sought by the victims' rights movement has made trial
more difficult for accusers. Victims' groups in some states have prohibited
pretrial depositions of victims. 195 The sponsors of such initiatives believe
that defendants will only harass victims during depositions, and that
depositions present no advantages for victims because there is no
opportunity to advocate before the judge or jury. Yet Crawford has greatly
increased the potential value of pretrial depositions to victims. In certain
circumstances, a victim who has afforded the defendant an opportunity for
cross-examination before trial need not appear at trial to testify. Her
hearsay statements related to the subject of the pretrial cross-examination
will be admissible at trial notwithstanding Crawford.196  Experts on
victims' psychology have counseled that pretrial cross-examination is
preferable to cross-examination at trial, because the atmosphere is less
stressful and the deponent can take breaks as needed. 197 While pretrial
cross-examination surely cannot replace trial testimony in the majority of
cases, the denial of this option to victims of domestic violence and sexual
assault is lamentable.
Of course, the leaders of the victim's rights movement did not intend to
cause difficulty for a subset of victims. By and large, the victims' rights
movement has made important strides for all victims. Like any movement
that spans diverse interests, the victims' rights movement faces a challenge
in propounding reforms that serve all the needs of its broad constituency.
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. See supra Part II.A.2.
194. See infra app. A (question 13) (noting that ninety-one percent of respondents
reported that victims of domestic violence are unlikely to cooperate with the prosecution
when subpoenaed as witnesses).
195. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1; Idaho Const. art 1, § 22(8); La. Const. art. 1, § 25; Or.
Const. art. 1, § 42(1)(c). Similarly, California's Proposition 115 sought to insulate victims
from pretrial examination by allowing magistrates to base probable cause findings in whole
or in part upon hearsay statements related by police. See Crime Victim's Justice Reform Act,
Initiative Measure Proposition 115 (codified at Cal. Penal Code § 872 (West Supp. 2005))
(approved by California voters on June 5, 1990).
196. Lininger, supra note 28, at 784-97 (citing cases supporting the proposition that
pretrial confrontation of accusers satisfies the requirements of Crawford); Mosteller, supra
note 28, 610-12 (advocating greater use of pretrial hearings to provide confrontation required
by Crawford).
197. Lindenmyer, supra note 28, at 4 (noting that depositions are less stressful for victims
than trial testimony, and encouraging prosecutors to arrange for pretrial depositions of
victims as a means of satisfying confrontation requirements); see Lininger, supra note 28, at
784-97 (suggesting that greater pretrial confrontation of accusers would ease their burden
after Crawford); Mosteller, supra note 28, at 610-12 (advocating greater use of pretrial
hearings to provide the confrontation required by Crawford).
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The foregoing analysis should not be construed as an indictment of the
victims' rights movement, but rather as a call to examine more closely the
subtle distinctions between classes of victims for whom the burden of cross-
examination may vary.
III. INADEQUACY OF PRESENT PROTECTIONS FOR ACCUSERS
The preceding section has argued that victims of domestic violence and
sexual assault face an increasingly difficult ordeal during cross-examination
in prosecutions of their assailants. The growing pressures on these accusers
test the adequacy of safeguards designed to minimize the hardship of cross-
examination. As seen below, the present safeguards are inadequate to the
task.
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) and Its State Counterparts
Rule 611(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") provides, in
pertinent part, as follows: "The court shall exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to . . .protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." 19 8
Over forty states have incorporated a version of FRE 611(a) into their
evidence codes. 199 At first glance, it appears that Rule 611 (a) might protect
accusers from scathing cross-examination in prosecutions of domestic
violence and sexual assault.
Yet in reality, Rule 611(a) is unhelpful for a number of reasons. First,
the rule does not include any concrete language indicating what constitutes
"harassment or undue embarrassment." There is a dearth of case law
applying Rule 611(a): A recent search of Westlaw found fewer than one
hundred opinions in federal and state court construing the excerpt of this
rule quoted above, and most of these interpretations are somewhat
perfunctory. Without much guidance in the language of the rule or in
judicial opinions interpreting the rule, there is little hope for consistent
application. Prominent commentators have suggested that Rule 611(a) sets
a very high standard for improper cross-examination. 200
Another problem is that many courts have refused to apply Rule 611 (a)
to limit impeachment that is otherwise permissible. Where an examining
attorney employs one of the established methods of impeachment-
showing bias, showing poor perception or memory, showing bad character
for truthfulness, showing prior inconsistent statements-the courts
generally presume that Rule 611(a) is inapplicable. 20' Of course,
198. Fed. R. Evid. 611(a).
199. 6 Weinstein, supra note 121, at T-86 to T-89 (noting that all jurisdictions have Rule
611(a) except California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Virginia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
200. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 13, at 571 ("Something close to intimidation may
of course be necessary on cross. .. . [Niecessarily there is an element of coercion.").
201. Brown v. Kentucky, No. 2003-SC-0235-MR, 2005 WL 1412379, at *8 (Ky. June 16,
2005) (holding that there was no violation of Rule 611(a) where questioning was permissible
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impeachment bearing these familiar labels may nonetheless cause
significant hardship for accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and
sexual assault. If courts construe Rule 611(a) to afford no additional
protection beyond the minimal safeguards in the other impeachment rules,
then Rule 61 l(a) is superfluous indeed.
Finally, the courts seem reluctant to apply Rule 611(a) absent strong
evidence of embarrassment. Some courts await outward manifestation of
trauma, such as crying. 20 2 Of course, if the witness has already begun
sobbing in court, the invocation of Rule 611(a) comes a little late. Courts
are unlikely to apply Rule 611 (a) in advance of a traumatic episode except
in situations when the accuser is a child.
Rule 611 (a), in reality, does little more than memorialize the trial judge's
inherent authority to supervise the courtroom. Battered women and rape
victims who seek concrete protection in Rule 611(a) are in for a
disappointment.
B. FRE 613(b) and Its State Counterparts
FRE Rule 613(b) provides as follows: "Extrinsic evidence of a prior
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party
is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interest
of justice otherwise require." 20 3  A majority of states have included
virtually identical language in their evidence codes. 204
The limitations of Rule 613(b) are readily apparent. The rule only
applies to impeachment with extrinsic evidence of an inconsistent statement
(e.g., a transcript or recording). The rule does not apply to extrinsic
evidence offered to show bias or bad character for truthfulness. If the
explanation of a witness is important after impeachment with prior
inconsistent statements, why isn't the witness's explanation just as
important after an allegation of ulterior motives or an allegation of prior
misconduct? One final concern is that the rule only applies to trials, not
pretrial hearings or sentencing hearings.
Even if Rule 613(b) were applied more broadly, its utility would be
questionable. The opportunity to explain or deny damning prior statements
does not ameliorate the difficulty of cross-examination. This right does not
head off improper questions before they are asked. This right does not
under the impeachment rules); Julian v. Creekside Health Ctr., No. 03MA21, 2004 WL
1376214, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Jun. 17, 2004) (finding Rule 611(a) inapplicable where the
purpose of questioning the witness "was not to cause him embarrassment; rather it was for
the purpose of impeachment"); State v. Perolis, 398 S.E.2d 512, 517 (W. Va. 1990) (stating
that "no witness should be protected from the embarrassment of proper impeachment").
202. E.g., State v. Just, 685 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Ariz. 1983) (finding no violation of Rule
611(a) where the witness did not manifest significant outward signs of stress; the mere
potential for such trauma was not sufficient for a protective order under Rule 611 (a)).
203. Fed. R. Evid. 613(b).
204. 6 Weinstein, supra note 121, at T-90 to T-94.
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protect the privacy of the witness. In fact, because most accusers go to
court without their own separate counsel, it is dubious that the accuser will
even recognize her right to explain or deny a prior inconsistent statement
pursuant to Rule 613(b). The opponent of the cross-examination (generally
the prosecutor) may not have much interest in prolonging cross-
examination by asking the accuser to explain or deny the inconsistencies.
C. Ethical Rules Against Harassment of Witnesses
Several ethics rules and standards address the lawyer's duties vis-A-vis
third-party witnesses. Rule 4.4(a) of the American Bar Association
("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use
methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a
person." 20 5 Subpart 5 of the Preamble to the Model Rules states that a
lawyer "should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and
not to harass or intimidate others." 20 6 The ABA Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice, a set of specialized standards for
prosecutors and defense attorneys, provides that "[t]he interrogation of all
witnesses should be conducted fairly, objectively, and with due regard for
the dignity and legitimate privacy of the witness, and without seeking to
intimidate or humiliate the witness unnecessarily." 20 7
These various ethical rules are largely ineffectual in policing lawyers'
mistreatment of witnesses during cross-examination. To begin with, proof
of a violation requires some means of determining the purpose of the
examining attorney. Under all of the above-listed rules, harsh questioning
is permissible unless its sole purpose is to traumatize the witness. Few
lawyers would admit such motivation, and the long time period between the
lawyers' misconduct and the bar disciplinary proceedings would permit
ample opportunity to come up with an acceptable explanation.
Second, the state bars' enforcement of ethical rules regarding cross-
examination has been notoriously lax. The number of published opinions in
which bar disciplinary panels have sanctioned attorneys for violating Rule
4.4(a) is miniscule. The other above-cited rules are not mandatory: They
are hortatory standards that lawyers can choose to ignore with impunity.
Third, and perhaps most important, these ethical standards seem to be at
odds with the time-honored mantra that lawyers should advocate
205. Dzienkowski, supra note 127, at 72. As of June 2005, forty-four states have adopted
some version of this rule.
206. Id. at 5.
207. Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 3-5.7(a) (The
Prosecution Function), reprinted in Dzeinkowski, supra note 127, at 924; Standards Relating
to the Admin. of Criminal Justice Standard 4-7.6(a) (The Defense Function), reprinted in
Dzeinkowski, supra note 127, at 935.
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zealously. 208 In rape cases, some lawyers engage in conduct they know to
be abusive of accusers because they feel their duty of zealous advocacy
requires it. 209  A few ethics scholars have urged restraint by defense
lawyers examining accusers in rape cases, 2 10 but this perspective remains a
minority view.
D. Rape Shield Laws
Three decades ago, advocates for rape victims realized that cross-
examination about the accusers' sexual history had become so harrowing
that many victims simply declined to report rapes to the police. Congress
and most state legislatures passed "rape shield laws" prohibiting the
introduction of evidence concerning the accusers' sexual history except in
certain limited circumstances. FRE 412 and its state equivalents recognize
the following permissible purposes for introducing the accuser's prior
sexual conduct: (1) to show prior consensual sex between the accuser and
the defendant; (2) to show that someone other than the defendant was the
source of the bodily fluid and cause of the injury at issue in the prosecution;
and (3) to introduce any evidence that the defendant has a constitutional
right to introduce. 2 11
FRE 412's shortcomings are evident on its face. The exception allowing
use of evidence concerning the accusers' prior consensual sex with the
accused seems based on the premise that women forfeit their right to say
"no" after voluntarily commencing a sexual relationship. Data collected
from eighteen states and the District of Columbia show that the incidence of
sex offenses committed in a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship is nearly as
high as the incidence of sex offenses committed by strangers. 2 12 When
courts limit rape shield laws to cases involving strangers, these laws
become worthless in eighty-five percent of all rape prosecutions.
2 13
208. Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 145 (defense lawyers are ethically bound to use even
distasteful tactics if they can thereby advance clients' interests); Freedman, supra note 5, at
1727 (extolling zealous advocacy by lawyers); Smith, supra note 5, at 930-34, 954
(defending zealous cross-examination by defense attorney in hate crimes prosecution).
209. Beneke, supra note 42, at 104-05 (noting that a defense lawyer resorts to sexist
arguments in a rape case because by failing to do so, he would forego a potentially winning
strategy); see Smith, supra note 5, at 954 ("There is nothing unethical about using. . . sexual
stereotypes in criminal defense. It is simply an aspect of zealous advocacy.").
210. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1026 (1990)
(disavowing harsh cross-examination of rape victims).
211. 6 Weinstein, supra note 121, at T-86 to T-89 (noting that a majority of states have a
version of FRE 412).
212. Matthew R. Durose, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Family Violence Statistics, Including
Statistics on Strangers and Acquaintances, No. NCJ 207846, at 29 (2005) (indicating that in
2000, the perpetrators of 2438 sex offenses were the boyfriends or girlfriends of the victims,
while the perpetrators of 3053 sex offenses were strangers).
213. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 272-73 (N.J. 2003) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[t]oday's decision essentially restricts our Rape Shield Law to sexual assaults between
victim and violent stranger, which translates into about fifteen percent of rapes").
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Another exception in the rape shield law-allowing admission of prior
sexual history to support the inference that another man was the cause of
the injury or the source of the semen found on the victim-invites
gamesmanship by the defense. A high proportion of rape examinations find
that the victim's body or clothing bears some residual biological evidence
of recent sex with a man other than the accused.214 Of course, this evidence
says less about the declining morality of women than it does about the
advances in forensic science. A defendant who learns that the accuser had
another sex partner near the time of the alleged rape will try to circumvent
the rape shield law by suggesting that the consensual partner was the source
of the semen or injury at issue in the rape prosecution. Such arguments
have a strong potential to embarrass the victim and inflame the prejudice of
the jury in the very manner that the original authors of the rape shield laws
sought to prevent. The probative value of "other source" evidence is slight,
because a woman who recently had consensual sex is no less entitled to
protection from an unwanted partner.
The final exception in the rape shield laws is, at first glance, simply
superfluous. This exception states the rape shield law will not bar the
admission of evidence that the defendant has a constitutional right to
present. The point goes without saying: A statute cannot trump the
Constitution. 215 Yet the inclusion of this truism in the rape shield law is not
simply harmless. It suggests that the rape shield law poses a greater
potential to offend the Constitution than do other rules of evidence. Very
few other rules memorialize their constitutional boundaries. 216  The
juxtaposition of Rule 412 with these other rules leaves judges with the
impression that they must approach the rape shield provisions with special
caution.2 17
Many defendants in rape prosecutions have overcome shield laws by
arguing that their proffered evidence does not directly indicate "sexual"
conduct by the defense. So, for example, defendants have been able to
introduce a diary entry in which an accuser indicated "I can't say no," a
third party's testimony that the accuser behaved in a "flirtatious" manner,
and evidence of prior "relationships" without any explicit mention of
sex.218 This evidence refers obliquely to sexual conduct, and therefore
214. Johnson, supra note 124 (stating that "[d]iscovery of semen from two men in a
medical examination of a rape victim is quite common" if the woman had sex recently
before the attack).
215. For example, no state has ever memorialized Bruton v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1210
(2003), in its version of Rule 801(d)(2), even though the number of Bruton violations far
exceeds the number of cases in which the rape shield laws violate the defendants' rights.
216. Some states did not even adopt this third exception, because the primacy of
constitutional law is so obvious. 6 Weinstein, supra note 121, at T-86 to T-89 (listing state
analogs of Rule 412).
217. Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing constitutional
concerns as the rationale for disregarding Ohio's rape shield statute, even though "to permit
cross-examination on these statements could lead to a trial of the victim's sexual history with
other men").
218. See supra note 122.
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implicates the core purposes of the rape shield law. If courts permit
defining the term "sexual" narrowly, the defense will be able to overcome
the rape shield law merely by offering circumstantial or indirect evidence of
sexual conduct by the accuser.
Procedural constraints also limit the value of rape shield laws to the
accuser. Without her own attorney, the accuser is not in a strong position to
enforce the law. The prosecutor is rarely a diligent guardian of accusers'
privacy rights. In fact, prosecutors may prefer not to object because they do
not wish to create the impression that they are "hiding something" from the
jury. Very few jurisdictions permit interlocutory review of rulings under
the rape shield law, and the government is unlikely to win an appeal based
on intrusive questioning of the victim. Thus, trial judges have little
accountability for neglecting to enforce the rape shield laws.
E. "Support Persons" in the Courtroom
Some states have enacted rules that permit "support persons" to
accompany victims as they testify at trial. For example, California Penal
Code section 868.5 allows one support person to stand or sit by the
witness's side when she takes the stand. The judge must "admonish the
support person or persons to not prompt, sway, or influence the witness in
any way." 219 If the presence of the support person interferes in any way
with the testimony of the witness, the judge may remove the support person
from court.220  A total of thirteen other states have enacted similar
provisions. 221
219. Cal. Penal Code § 868.5 (West 2005).
220. Id.
221. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10401 (2004) (allowing a "victim's advocate"---defined as
"any person whose regular or volunteer duties include the support of an alleged victim of
physical or sexual abuse or assault"-to remain at trial even if the general public is
sequestered); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/4(9) (West 2002) (giving all victims of crime
"[t]he right to have present at all court proceedings, subject to the rules of evidence, an
advocate or other support person of the victim's choice"); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
600.2163a(4) (West 2000) (providing that a victim of sexual assault or child abuse "who is
called upon to testify shall be permitted to have a support person sit with, accompany, or be
in close proximity to the witness during his or her testimony"); Minn. Stat. § 631.046 (2003)
(allowing victims of sexual assault or child abuse to bring a "parent, guardian, or other
supportive person" to be present "at the omnibus hearing or at the trial"); N.Y. Crim. P. Law
§ 190.25(3)(h) (McKinney 2005) (providing that victims who are twelve years old or
younger may be accompanied by a "social worker, rape crisis counselor, psychologist or
other professional"); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit., § 60.4(K) (West 2003) (allowing a support person
to accompany a domestic victim but not to make legal arguments); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-
105-40 (2004) (providing that support persons may join victims during testimony during
disciplinary proceedings at "institutions of higher learning"); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-1-11
(2004) (providing that a "victim or witness assistant" may accompany a victim to court); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-265.01 (West 2004) (allowing a parent or guardian of a minor victim, or
any other adult chosen by the victim, to be present at trial); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.69.030(10)
(2005) (providing that the victim of a violent or sex crime may have "a crime victim
advocate from a crime victim/witness program, or any other support person of the victim's
choosing, present at... judicial proceedings related to criminal acts committed against the
victim"); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-408(b) (2005) (allowing a support person to be present
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The support person assists the victim in a number of ways. At a
minimum, the presence of the support person assures the victim that she is
not alone. The support person is a familiar, soothing sight. During
especially difficult portions of the trial, the victim can regain her composure
by focusing on the support person. In addition, the defendant may be less
likely to glower at the accuser when a support person is sitting nearby in a
tight phalanx.
But the value of the support person should not be overstated. The
support person has no power to parry an improper question by an
attorney.222 The support person usually cannot advocate on behalf of the
witness in pretrial hearings. The judge, who may regard the support person
as an interloper or a distraction, 223 is unlikely to solicit this person's input
on any matter during the trial. In fact, it is unlikely that the transcript of a
trial in which a support person accompanied the victim would look any
different from the transcript of a trial lacking a support person.
Indeed, in some ways, the presence of a mute companion may just
accentuate the passivity and helplessness of a victim/accuser. Whereas the
defendant and the prosecution bring powerful advocates to the courtroom,
the victim has only a silent partner. The attorneys for the prosecution and
defense merit the judge's attention, but the judge has little interaction with
the victim's companion. The jury pays heed to counsels' arguments and
questions, but the jury soon tires of the support person's unspeaking role.
Without belittling the complex psychological needs of the victim, there is a
marked disparity between a lawyer's representation and a layperson's
companionship. The inefficacy of the support person underscores the
powerlessness of the victim herself.
IV. TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
In order to craft a set of reforms that accords adequate protection to
accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault, it is first
necessary to reconceptualize cross-examination. Two paradigmatic shifts
are necessary. First, the bilateral model of advocacy in criminal trials must
give way to a more nuanced trilateral model. Second, the teleological
with a child victim of incest or sexual assault during a videotaped deposition); Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 39(b)(9) (giving the victim the "right to name an appropriate support person, including a
victim's caseworker, to accompany the victim at any interview, deposition, or court
proceeding, except where such support person's testimony is required in the case"); see also
State v. Dunbar, 566 A.2d 970, 973 (Vt. 1989) (allowing for a victim of child molestation to
testify with two support persons present).
222. Cf Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies:
Prioritizing Victims' Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11
Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 465, 488 (2003) (stating that "effective advocacy requires
more than mere accompaniment into the courtroom").
223. In Commonwealth v. Harris, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts expressed
consternation that a victim's advocate held the hand of the decedent's mother during a
murder trial, but that court concluded that there was no reversible error. 567 N.E.2d 899, 905
(Mass. 1991).
20051 1393
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conception of victims' testimony must yield to a Kantian deontological
perspective that respects individual moral autonomy for its own sake.
These two arguments will be presented in turn below.
A. A Different Paradigm: The Trilateral Adversarial Process
The bilateral model of adversarial conflict pervades the United States'
criminal justice system. Our legal culture clings to the notion that there are
only two sides to legal disputes, including criminal prosecutions. The
prosecution brings criminal charges to right wrongs done to society as a
whole. The defendant tries to vindicate his innocence. All other interests in
the courtroom ally themselves with one side or the other in the bipolar
conflict.
The conception of a bilateral adversarial process has significant
implications for our criminal justice system. For example, only the
prosecution or the defense has standing to assert a claim, negotiate
disposition of the case, or file an appeal. Evidence law also tracks the
bilateral framework. Only parties may offer evidence. Only parties may
object to the introduction of evidence. The admissions doctrine is only
available when the government seeks to offer a statement by the defendant,
not when the defendant seeks to offer a statement by the victim (a
nonparty). "Prejudice" is measured vis-a-vis the interests of parties. The
bilateral adversarial system, in effect, relegates accusers to the sidelines.
The inadequacy of the bipolar model is evident in several categories of
prosecutions, but none provides a starker example than the prosecution of
domestic violence and sexual assault. In these cases, prosecutorial interests
diverge from the victims' interests to such a degree that they are closer to
being adversarial than coextensive. The disjunction between prosecutors'
objectives and victims' objectives are most apparent in three contexts: (1)
prosecutors' unwillingness to protect victims' privacy, (2) prosecutors'
impeachment of victims, and (3) prosecutors' and victims' different
standards for measuring the success of a criminal case.
To begin with, prosecutors do not share victims' sense of urgency in
protecting against disclosure of sensitive personal information. Prosecutors
are generally very cautious about making evidentiary objections. They fear
objections will signal to jurors that the government has something to
hide.224 Another reason why prosecutors may forego valid objections is
that by giving defense counsel wide leeway, prosecutors eliminate possible
appellate grounds. Prosecutors have an ethical and constitutional obligation
to disclose material that undermines the credibility of the prosecution's
224. Prosecutor Paul Schechtman offered this perspective at a conference on the campus
of New York University: "My general rule as a prosecutor is not to object often because
otherwise it looks like you're hiding something." Schechtman conceded that his approach
"may not be in the victim's interest." Paul Schechtman, Comments on Professor
Yaroshefsky's Paper, 1989 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 157, 162 (1990); see also Taslitz, supra note
18, at 98 (noting that "[t]oo many objections will, of course, annoy the jury.").
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witnesses. 225 Cynical prosecutors may believe that defense harassment of
accusers is helpful because it may outrage the jury and increase the
likelihood of conviction. Victims, on the other hand, have no ethical
obligation to be forthright about their foibles, and they have a much
stronger interest in privacy.
There is a second reason why the bilateral adversarial model inaccurately
describes the relationship between prosecutors and victims: The
government frequently impeaches accusers. FRE 607 and its state
counterparts allow impeachment of a witness by the party who called the
witness. The convergence of "no drop" policies and stricter confrontation
requirements make such impeachment far more likely than in the past.
Some evidence suggests that the government's most effective response to
Crawford has been to increase reliance on Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which allows
impeachment of accusers with their prior inconsistent statements. 226 As
observed by one seasoned veteran of domestic violence prosecutions,
"Whoever calls the complainant loses. '227
One final reason for the discordant relationship between the prosecutor
and the accuser is the different standard by which the two groups measure
the success of a prosecution. Prosecutors have a short-term perspective.
They focus on the jury verdict and the length of the sentence. A guilty
verdict and a long sentence mean that the prosecution has prevailed; an
acquittal or a short sentence brings disappointment. Prosecutors have other
ancillary concerns such as managing huge caseloads and maintaining good
relationships with repeat players in criminal court, but their primary
concern is the "scorecard" of convictions and jail time. The accuser, for her
part, has a far different gauge for measuring the success of a prosecution. A
prosecution is successful for the accuser if it facilitates her long-term
emotional recovery, strengthens her sense of self-determination, and leaves
open the possibility of rebuilding interpersonal relationships (perhaps even
with the defendant). In addition, the victim hopes that the prosecution will
improve-or at least not limit-the odds of success in parallel civil
litigation;228 prosecutors are subject to ethical rules that prohibit them from
taking actions to assist civil proceedings, and prosecutors typically regard
225. The Supreme Court's ruling in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires that
the prosecution must disclose all exculpatory information to the defense, including
information that weakens the accuser's credibility. ABA Model Rule 3.8 and its state
analogs impose on prosecutors an ethical duty similar to Brady's requirements.
226. Tom Lininger, supra note 28, at 805 (noting that jurisdictions that relied the most
heavily on Rule 801(d)(1)(A) had the fewest dismissals after Crawford).
227. Michelle Maxian, N.Y. City Legal Aid Soc'y, Comments at the Brooklyn Law
Review Symposium: Crawford v. Washington: The Future of the Confrontation Clause in
Light of its Past (Feb. 18, 2005) (transcript on file with author).
228. Accusers pursue parallel civil litigation to recover monetary damages, apply for
restraining orders, file for a divorce, and/or obtain custody of their children, among other
purposes.
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parallel civil litigation as a nuisance that hinders the attainment of
prosecutorial goals.229
Given the recurring conflict of interest between prosecutors and defense
attorneys, a model that posits their unflagging camaraderie has outlived its
usefulness. A better model would conceive of a trilateral struggle in
criminal trials. The prosecution, the defense, and the victim all vie against
one another, occasionally forming alliances, occasionally standing apart.
By disabusing legislatures, courts, and litigants of the fallacious notion that
prosecutors and victims always have identical interests, a trilateral
adversarial model will clear the way for reforms that will accord victims the
fair treatment they deserve.
Simply put, there are more interests in the courtroom than those that fall
under the taxonomy of "prosecution" or "defense." The two-legged stool
that is our present criminal justice system requires a third leg to prevent it
from crashing to the ground.
B. Deontogical Deconstruction of the Victims' Rights Movement
Why hasn't the victims' rights movement embraced the trilateral model
and pushed for reforms that would mitigate the hardship of cross-
examination? One reason is that some leaders of the victims' rights
movement 230 have conceived of victims' testimony as an instrument to
further prosecutors' goals. Because prosecutors undervalue victims'
privacy and wish to preserve their own option to impeach victims, they
steer the victims' rights movement away from a divisive agenda that would
ameliorate the hardship of cross-examination. Instead, the victims' rights
movement frequently addresses other legislative priorities on which
prosecutors and victims can agree: longer sentences and fewer procedural
protections for defendants.
It is important to understand the interdependence of prosecutors and the
high-profile relatives of crime victims who serve as spokespeople for the
victims' rights movement. The spokespeople have compelling personal
stories, and they can muster a popular majority in favor of reforms. On the
other hand, prosecutors have the technical expertise that legislators respect.
The result is an expedient symbiosis: The lay spokespeople give the
movement its political appeal, and the prosecutors do much of the important
229. Gregory Sarno, Annotation, Initiating, or Threatening to Initiate, Criminal
Prosecution as Ground for Disciplining Counsel, 42 A.L.R.4th 1000, §1 (2005); see Milton
Pollack, Annotation, Parallel Civil & Criminal Proceedings, 129 F.R.D. 201, 208-12 (1990)
(listing cases in which the government has sought to stay parallel civil proceedings in order
to avoid prejudice against the prosecution).
230. It is important to note here that the victims' rights movement is not a monolithic
movement. The movement includes some sophisticated advocates such as Douglas Beloof at
the National Victims Rights Law Center and Professor Erin Ann O'Hara at the Vanderbilt
University Law School, who have a subtle understanding of the predicament faced by
accusers in prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. The analysis that follows
applies to some, but certainly not all, of the advocates in the victims' rights movement.
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"behind the scenes" work. The relationship is akin to the partnership
between "Baptists and bootleggers" in the prohibition era.
231
One consequence of crime victims' dependence on prosecutors to further
the legislative agenda is the inability of either partner to effect reforms
without the approval of the other. So, for example, prosecutors are unable
to pass legislation that would make plea bargaining easier, because crime
victims oppose this reform. Crime victims are unable to pass legislation
that would strengthen their privacy because prosecutors oppose such a
change.232
Prosecutors and victims do concur on the need for stricter sentences,
reduced procedural "technicalities" that favor defendants, and presentation
of "victim impact statements" that drive up sentences. The talisman of
"victims' rights" is sometimes invoked to promote measures that bear little
relation to the rights of victims, unless those "rights" are nothing more than
the right to aggressive prosecution. For example, in Oregon, "victims'
rights" became the primary marketing theme for ballot measures that
sought, inter alia, to permit nonunanimous jury verdicts in certain cases, to
change the procedures for prosecutorial immunization of witnesses, and to
prevent convicts from serving on juries. 233
In many respects, the present victims' rights movement exemplifies the
triumph of teleology over deontology. Victims' testimony is a means to the
end of prosecutorial victory. Some spokespeople for the victims' rights
movement accord too little emphasis to the intrinsic importance of victims
themselves. Kant counsels that the individual cannot be an instrument to
another end. Every person--especially a crime victim-has moral
autonomy. A duty-based philosophy of law would improve prosecutors'
treatment of victims rather than subordinating victims' interests for the
utilitarian purpose of maximizing convictions. Victims' exercise of self-
determination is an important objective for its own sake, and it also
improves the likelihood that victims will leave abusive relationships and
avoid future victimization.
231. Erin O'Hara, a strong advocate for victims' rights, made this analogy in her article,
Victim Participation in the Political Process, 13 J.L. & Pol'y 229, 242 (2005) (citing Bruce
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, Regulation,
May-June 1983).
232. E-mail from Sybil Hebb, Director of Legislative Advocacy, Oregon Law Center, to
Tom Lininger, Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law (Mar. 21, 2005,
17:32 PST) (on file with author) (indicating that prosecutors' resistance was a significant
reason why the Oregon Legislature did not strengthen the victim-counselor privilege in
2005).
233. These measures were part of a package (Ballot Measures 69 through 75) presented to
Oregon voters through the initiative process in 1999. For more information about the
measures, see the website for Oregon Crime Victims United,
http://www.crimevictimsunited.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2005). I do not necessarily argue
that all of these proposals lacked merit. As a former prosecutor myself, and as one who
respects the leaders of Oregon Crime Victims United, I understand the policy reasons for
some of the proposed reforms. I believe, however, that the rubric of victims' rights is not the
best label for such proposals.
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V. PROPOSED REFORMS TO AMELIORATE HARDSHIP OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION
In 2005, the crisis of victims' waning confidence in the criminal justice
system evokes memories of another transformative moment in the evolution
of criminal procedure. In the 1970s, rape victims lost faith in the justice
system because defendants could impeach them with highly sensitive and
prejudicial allegations concerning the accusers' sexual history. Amidst
concerns about declining rates of reporting, a broad alliance coalesced to
support a set of reforms that included the original rape shield laws. Now, as
in the 1970s, the plight of battered women and rape victims has grown so
abject as to provide the impetus for another significant advance in criminal
procedure and evidence law. Listed below are ten proposals that would
adapt courtroom procedure to acknowledge, and facilitate, a trilateral
adversarial process.
A. Legal Representation for Accusers
Neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor any of their state
counterparts explicitly authorize an accuser to bring counsel to a criminal
trial. It is extremely rare for accusers to retain counsel, and in the few cases
when accusers are represented, their attorneys generally lack standing to
object during cross-examination or to make arguments at pretrial
evidentiary hearings. 234 Victims must depend on prosecutors to object
when defense counsel's cross-examination violates the rules of evidence.
As noted previously, prosecutors are fickle allies for victims, because
prosecutors are wary of objections, and they themselves may wish to
impeach the victims at some point.
Separate representation by counsel offers the best means of protecting
accusers from abusive questioning in cross-examination. The rules of
evidence should allow accusers to retain their own counsel, and should give
the accuser's attorney standing to object to any party's questioning. The
accuser's attorney should be able to attend any hearing on evidentiary
issues relating to the accuser. Further, the accuser's attorney should be able
to pursue interlocutory review. Where necessary, the accuser's attorney
should have an interpreter, and the interpreter should be available well in
advance of trial so that non-English-speaking victims can prepare
adequately for their trial testimony. The law should set some clear
boundaries: Accusers' attorneys may not make opening or closing
statements, may not examine witnesses, may not offer any evidence, and
may not make any arguments concerning sentencing. The attorney's sole
purpose would be to protect the accuser from improper cross-examination.
234. Douglas E. Beloof, Enabling Rape Shield Procedures Under Crime Victims'
Constitutional Privacy Rights, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 291, 292-94 (2005) (discussing lack of
standing); see Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-
Centered Critique, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 21, 59 (1992) ("The system is not equipped to
nurture victims or their representatives.").
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Who would pay for accusers' counsel? Public funding should be
available just as in the case of appointing counsel for indigent defendants.
Given the scarcity of public funding available for indigent defense, 235 state
legislatures should consider new strategies to raise money for accusers'
counsel. Applications for victim assistance grants under the Violence
Against Women Act might present one means of subsidizing counsel for
accusers.236 State legislatures should pass new laws fining attorneys for
unethical conduct-particularly misconduct that harms accusers-and the
revenue from these fines should be devoted to paying for accusers'
counsel. 237 Perhaps state bars could once again revise their anemic pro
bono guidelines to channel more volunteer hours to the representation of
accusers in criminal prosecutions. 238 A more ambitious alternative would
be to create incentives for law students or recent law graduates to represent
accusers-perhaps in lieu of a sixth semester in law school, or as an
alternative to taking the bar exam.
Separate counsel for accusers would bring several advantages. The
courtroom environment would be more civil. Accusers would feel less
pressure on the stand. Counsel could recognize possible bases for
objections that accusers or prosecutors would not think (or choose) to raise.
The accuser's counsel could help "translate" the accuser's concerns into
objections that are cognizable in the legal system. Conversely, the
accuser's counsel could impress upon her the importance of following the
judge's instructions and the rules of evidence. Counsel could help the
accuser prepare for trial, so that she is better able to respond to foreseeable
questions by the defense or the prosecution. The likely result would be that
accusers become more confident, more forthright, and less evasive on the
stand. The accuser's counsel could help the accuser with ancillary matters
such as applying for a restraining order, obtaining victim assistance, filing
for a divorce, seeking custody of children, or seeking civil damages in a tort
suit. The experience of several European countries demonstrates that
separate counsel for accusers can make a real difference in securing
remedies and emboldening the accuser to testify. 239
235. David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1281 (2002) (describing "[tlhe drastic underfunding of indigent
defense systems").
236. The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), reauthorized on several occasions,
has appropriated millions of dollars for state and local programs to assist victims of domestic
violence. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to
Domestic Violence, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1848 (2002).
237. See generally Stephen G. Ben6, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach
to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 907 (1991).
238. In most states' bar codes, Rule 6.1 calls on lawyers to provide fifty hours of pro
bono service per year, primarily to indigent clients. Rule 6.1 is completely precatory, and
state bars do not enforce compliance. Nationwide, the average pro bono service for the
profession is less than one half hour a week. Deborah Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics
763 (3d ed. 2001).
239. William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L. 37, 54-63, 55 n.79
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One of the most important benefits of separate counsel for accusers is
that prosecutors may focus entirely on the interests of the state, rather than
worrying about the need to protect the accuser's interests. The American
criminal justice system would finally provide what the ethical rules have
demanded for decades: separate representation for all conflicting
interests.240
B. Prohibition of Impeachment by Reference to Parallel Civil Suits
The rules of evidence should be amended to include a new provision
barring impeachment of an accuser on the ground that she is simultaneously
litigating a tort claim arising from the same facts at issue in the criminal
prosecution. This new rule might fit well in a revised version of Rule
610,241 or perhaps in one of the policy exclusions in Rules 407-412.242
Presently defendants have little difficulty impeaching accusers with
evidence of parallel civil claims. 243 The defendants argue that the accusers'
interest in civil litigation makes them biased in the criminal prosecutions. 244
Such impeachment is virtually inevitable in a prosecution of a celebrity,245
but it also occurs in lower-profile prosecutions. 246
There are three reasons why a ban on such impeachment would be good
public policy. First, the pendency of parallel civil litigation has scant
(1996) (discussing German and Italian procedures allowing victims' attorneys to take part in
prosecutions).
240. Most states' bar codes include Rule 1.7(a), which prohibits a lawyer from
simultaneously representing two conflicting interests, whether the conflict has already
materialized or there exists a strong possibility that a conflict will arise in the future.
241. FRE 610 prohibits impeachment on the basis of religion. A revised rule could list
several impermissible grounds for impeachment, such as religion, parallel civil litigation,
etc.
242. FRE 407 prohibits reference to the defendant's subsequent remedial measures. FRE
408 bars evidence relating to settlement negotiations and settlement offers. FRE 409
precludes evidence of the defendant's willingness to pay medical bills. FRE 410 makes plea
discussions inadmissible. FRE 411 prohibits evidence of liability insurance. FRE 412 is the
rape shield law. All of these rules limit the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence in
order to advance policy objectives.
243. Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Right to Cross-Examine Prosecuting Witness as to his
Pending or Contemplated Civil Action Against Accused for Damages Arising out of Same
Transaction, 98 A.L.R.3d 1060, § 2(a) (2004) (noting that "[t]he general rule is that it is
proper for the accused to cross-examine the prosecuting witness as to his pending or
contemplated civil action against the accused").
244. See generally United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (stating that
impeachment on grounds of bias is generally relevant).
245. E.g., Kirk Johnson, Twist in Bryant Rape Case as Accuser Files Lawsuit, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 2004, at A13 (noting that the filing of civil suit subjected the accuser to
impeachment by the defense in the criminal prosecution of Kobe Bryant); Martin Kasindorf,
Jackson Defense Strategy: 'A Lot of Witnesses', U.S.A. Today, May 2, 2005, at 5A
(reporting that Michael Jackson's defense attorney sought to impeach the accuser's family
because they had filed a civil lawsuit).
246. E.g., Bryan Dickerson, Rape Victims Rarely Sue-Cost Too High, Detroit Free Press,
May 17, 2000, at IB, available at
http://www.freep.connews/metro/dickerl7_20000517.html (reporting on a lawsuit by a
rape victim against her alleged assailant).
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relevance to the accusers' credibility in a criminal prosecution. 2 47 The fact
that a purported victim of sexual abuse or domestic violence seeks a civil
remedy is not surprising. Criminal prosecutions generally do not afford any
monetary relief to accusers. Indeed, it would be more noteworthy if the
accuser did not file a civil lawsuit, because the burden of proof and the
evidentiary rules are much more favorable to civil plaintiffs than to the
prosecution in a criminal case.2 48 Defendants in criminal prosecutions have
sometimes attempted to impeach accusers on the ground that the accusers
did not file any civil lawsuits.249 if accusers genuinely believed they were
victims of crime (by definition, an intentional tort), why wouldn't they
bring civil claims? Further, the notion that a civil suit gives rise to bias
falsely presumes some baseline level of neutrality-as if the accuser would
be an impartial witness in the criminal case but for her financial stake in the
civil suit. 250
Second, impeachment based on simultaneous civil litigation is highly
prejudicial in a criminal prosecution. When jurors hear that the accuser
stands to gain financially from a guilty verdict, the jurors react with a
revulsion that is disproportionate to the importance of this fact.25 1 The
tendency of jurors to place undue significance on financial matters has led
to the promulgation of FRE 411, which prohibits jurors from learning that a
civil defendant is insured. Because the civil remedial system is essentially
"insurance" that redresses torts, why should the jurors learn that the accuser
is availing herself of this system? Such knowledge may actually cause
prejudice against the defendant. Crime victims will only sue defendants
with deep pockets; suits against "judgment-proof' defendants would be
247. The defendant has a right to impeach only where the impeachment grounds are
relevant. Compare Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (overruling the trial court
where the prohibited impeachment would have done significant damage to the prosecution's
case), with Fed. R. Evid. 412 (determining, as a categorical matter, that the relevance of an
accuser's consensual sexual history is outweighed by its prejudicial effect in a rape
prosecution).
248. For example, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is unavailable to
defendants in civil cases.
249. E.g., State v. Sexsmith, 57 P.2d 1249, 1250 (Wash. 1936) (concerning a defendant
who sought to cross-examine the accuser about why he had decided against filing a lawsuit,
the Washington Supreme Court found no error in trial court's ruling prohibiting this
questioning).
250. Reeves v. State, 432 So. 2d 543 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (finding no harm where the
defendant was prohibited from cross-examining the accuser about her parallel civil litigation
seeking damages for rape, because the nature of the alleged crime made her highly
prejudiced against defendant irrespective of her potential to recover damages); People v.
Murray, 261 P. 740 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927) (finding no error in prohibiting cross-
examination of the accuser regarding her civil complaint, because the purpose of this cross-
examination was to show her hostility toward the defendant, which was amply apparent in
her testimony during the criminal prosecution).
251. Dickerson, supra note 246 (noting that "[a]lthough the public has little difficulty
appreciating an ordinary assault victim's desire for restitution, some jurors are more
suspicious when a rape victim brings all her legal remedies to bear").
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futile.252 So the introduction of evidence regarding a parallel civil suit tells
the jury more about the defendant's assets (a potentially prejudicial fact)
than about the accuser's bias.
Third, impeachment of accusers by reference to civil litigation has the
unfortunate effect of discouraging such litigation. When the accuser knows
that she will be raked over the coals in a criminal trial if she files a civil
claim, she may opt to forego the tort remedy in order to strengthen her
credibility as a witness for the prosecution. 253  A one-year statute of
limitations for tort claims in many states 254 does not give the victim the
luxury of waiting until the conclusion of the criminal case before filing the
tort claim. Civil suits against rapists and batterers are not always lucrative,
and do not signal such strong social condemnation as a criminal
prosecution, but the civil strategy needs to be nurtured, especially after the
Supreme Court has constrained criminal prosecutions with new hearsay
rules 255 and has struck down federal civil remedies for violence against
women.
256
The potential friction between a criminal prosecution and a victim's civil
litigation illustrates the necessity for a trilateral adversarial model. Of
course, the defendant is adversarial to the accuser/plaintiff in both contexts.
Perhaps surprisingly, the prosecution and the victim are often at odds as
well. The prosecutor shudders at the thought of the wide-ranging discovery
that is permissible in the civil suit. The prosecutor also worries that a
settlement of the civil suit might undermine the victim's willingness to go
forward with the criminal case. To be sure, both the prosecution and the
defense would probably prefer that there were no civil claims at all. Even if
the prosecutor were inclined to assist the defendant's civil action, ethical
rules preclude attorneys from using criminal proceedings to influence civil
cases.
257
Criminal trials do not remediate. They castigate or vindicate. Because
neither of these results provides adequate redress to the victim, it is
understandable that she may pursue a civil claim alongside the criminal
prosecution. The law should not penalize victims who seek recourse in
both settings; the law should encourage them.
252. John W. Gillis & Douglas E. Beloof, The Next Step for a Maturing Victim Rights
Movement: Enforcing Crime Victim Rights in the Courts, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 689, 699
(2002) (recognizing that perpetrators' lack of assets forecloses tort litigation in many cases).
253. Dickerson, supra note 246 (stating that "[m]any rape victims.., conclude that
foreswearing any interest in civil damages is the price they must pay to establish their own
credibility" as a witness in the criminal prosecution).
254. Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in
Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 Or. L. Rev. 945, 1015-19 (2004)
(noting that a one-year statute of limitations is a significant obstacle to tort suits by battered
women).
255. See supra Part II.A.1.
256. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating VAWA's civil remedy
for exceeding federal power to regulate interstate commerce).
257. Sarno, supra note 229.
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C. Fortification of Victim-Counselor Privilege
The time has come to strengthen the evidentiary privilege for
communications between victims and counselors. Presently a majority of
states recognized such a privilege, but in many states the privilege is
"qualified" rather than "absolute." 258 In other words, a qualified privilege
could yield when the defendant proves that the impeachment material he
seeks is relevant to his defense and unavailable from any other source. An
absolute privilege would be preferable, so that victims of domestic violence
and sexual assault may speak candidly to their counselors without fearing
the revelation of their confidences in court.
In the related context of the patient-psychotherapist privilege, the
Supreme Court has recognized that an absolute privilege is necessary to
realize the policy objective of fostering effective treatment:
Effective psychotherapy.., depends upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank
and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.
Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which
individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential
communications made during counseling sessions may cause
embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential
relationship necessary for successful treatment. 259
This rationale applies with equal force to counseling for accusers in
prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. The assurance of
confidentiality is necessary for these victims to receive effective counseling.
In addition to its value in fostering therapy, an absolute victim-counselor
privilege would exclude highly prejudicial evidence that has scant
relevance. Jurors sometimes overreact when they learn that a victim has
sought counseling. 260 This fact does not indicate the mental frailty of the
victim; more likely it indicates just the opposite. The uninhibited
communication between victim and counselor-veering into the victims'
secret fears, desires, and self-doubt--could inflame the jury's prejudice.
Moreover, there is a risk that a victim's reference in counseling to her prior
sexual history would allow the defendant to make an "end-run around rape
shield laws" if the communication were not subject to an absolute
privilege. 261
Some critics have noted the difficulty of determining exactly who
qualifies as a "counselor" of a rape victim or battered woman. In many
jurisdictions, the position of counselor does not require professional
certification or state licensure. Yet states could easily establish procedures
for certifying certain counselors as qualifying for the protection of the
258. Hebert, supra note 40, at 1466-7 1.
259. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
260. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 1388-97.
261. Id. at 1375.
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privilege. Further, other privilege rules have covered relationships that are
far harder to define than the victim-counselor relationship, such as the
clergy-penitent relationship. Courts will occasionally need to make
difficult decisions in order to establish the boundaries of the victim-
counselor privilege, but counselors' concern for victims will lead them to
proceed cautiously so that they can protect victims' confidences.
Critics have also raised constitutional objections to an absolute privilege
for victim-counselor communications. Arguably, such a privilege would
deny defendants access to critical impeachment material, violating their
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against them. In Davis v.
Alaska, the U.S. Supreme Court found a violation of the Sixth Amendment
where the defendant could not gain access to evidence he needed to
impeach an accuser on grounds of bias.262 Yet counseling records do not
necessarily implicate the defendant's constitutional rights. The rape shield
law, which reflects a similar balancing of probative value versus prejudicial
effect, has been upheld repeatedly despite constitutional challenges. 263
States with absolute victim-counselor privileges have upheld their
constitutionality as well. 264
An absolute privilege for victim-counselor communication would address
the primary concern of the trilateral adversarial model: Victims cannot rely
on prosecutors to enforce zealously an amorphous "qualified" privilege. A
clearly defined, predictable privilege would give victims both solace and
independence.
D. Reform of Rape Shield Laws
Rape shield laws require a number of modifications to realize their dual
purposes of protecting accusers' privacy and minimizing disincentives for
reporting. First, the shield laws should include strict penalties for knowing
disclosure of the accusers' sexual history by parties, lawyers, or court
personnel who learn this information in secret in camera hearings. This
information should be protected as carefully as wiretap information.265
While courts have virtually no power to prevent the media from reporting
leaked information, courts can impose severe sanctions on insiders who
disclose secrets to the media.
Second, accusers must have standing to pursue interlocutory review of
adverse rulings on the admissibility of the accusers' sexual history.
262. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319-21 (1974).
263. For a constitutional analysis of rape shield laws, see Michelle J. Anderson, From
Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 51, 153-61 (2002), and J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino,
Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 544, 589-90 (1980).
264. E.g., People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 90 (Ill. 1988); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602
A.2d 1290, 1297 (Pa. 1992).
265. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 establishes
criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of wiretap information. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (2000).
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Presently, only a few states give prosecutors the right to seek interlocutory
review of rulings under the rape shield law, and no state gives accusers such
standing. 266 As noted previously, victims cannot rely on prosecutors to
vindicate their privacy concerns. Further, if trial courts do not face
immediate accountability to higher courts for their rulings on the accusers'
sexual history, there will be natural inclination to err on the side of
admission. After all, victims have no standing to appeal, and prosecutors'
appellate rights are extremely limited; only defendants have strong
appellate rights on evidentiary issues. 267
Third, the exceptions to the rape shield laws should be narrowed
somewhat. Evidence of prior consensual sex between the accuser and the
defendant should not be automatically admissible: Such a rule implies that
women waive their right to say "no" if they ever consent to sex with a
particular partner. The law should set a higher threshold for relevance,
perhaps by imposing a temporal proximity requirement or a balancing test
that requires the probative value to outweigh prejudicial effect. Similar
restrictions are appropriate for the shield laws' second exception, which
allows evidence of sex with others to show that a different man was the
source of injury or bodily fluid found on the victim. The negligible
relevance of residual semen from a consensual partner will rarely outweigh
the prejudicial effect of this evidence. Pattern jury instructions will be
useful in cautioning jurors against overreliance on such evidence, if the
judge chooses to admit it.
Fourth, the rape shield laws should prohibit not only direct discussion of
the accusers' prior sexual activity, but also indirect evidence and allusions
to such activity. Recent cases have admitted diaries that seem to refer in
general terms to sexual conduct, and evidence of prior "relationships" that
were evidently sexual in nature.268 If defendants can so easily circumvent
the shield laws by referring indirectly to improper topics, the laws will be of
little value. The courts should severely discipline counsel who refer in any
way to topics that are off limits under the shield law. Some counsel
brazenly allude to inadmissible sexual history because they know that the
most likely sanction will simply be a sustained objection. 269 Perhaps the
court should punish such tactics by requiring the offending attorney to pay
the victim's counsel fees.
Fifth, the rape shield law should specify that any defendant who
successfully introduces the accuser's sexual history cannot demand
266. E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(c)(3) (West Supp. 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. §
40.210(4)(c) (2003).
267. Anderson, supra note 263, at 95 nn.230-32 (noting that most appeals addressing the
application of rape shield laws have been brought by defendants).
268. See supra note 125.
269. In one case, defense counsel sought to sidestep limitations on sexual history
evidence by simply asking, "Do you know what that feels like... [t]o have somebody
climax inside of you?" The judge sustained the prosecution's objection on the basis of the
rape shield law, but the court did not discipline the defense attorney. Taslitz, supra note 18,
at 85.
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exclusion of his own sexual history, either in the criminal prosecution or in
a subsequent civil case arising from the same facts. It is no small irony that
one year after Kobe Bryant's defense team insisted that exclusion of the
accuser's sexual history would prevent a fair trial, the defendant was not
held accountable for his own sexual history in the civil case. 270 There is
precedent in the Federal Rules of Evidence for an equitable theory of
waiver when the defendant has introduced evidence of the victim's
character and thereafter seeks to bar similar evidence of his own
character. 27 1 What's good for the goose is good for the gander.
These various revisions of the rape shield laws are vital because the
prosecution's interests in privacy issues do not always align with the
victims' interests. In a bipolar paradigm, prosecutors might naturally favor
the disclosure of the victims' embarrassing history, so as to extinguish
possible appellate grounds and avoid creating the impression that the
prosecution is concealing evidence from the jury. A trilateral model for the
conflicting interests in the courtroom recognizes that the victim needs
guarantees, irrespective of the prosecutor's vigilance, that her privacy will
not be sacrificed.
E. Liberalized Use of Prior Consistent Statements
Generally, it is far easier to impeach an accuser with prior inconsistent
statements than to rehabilitate with prior consistent statements. Where prior
statements are used primarily to attack, rather than support, the accuser, this
asymmetry compounds the accuser's resentment of the legal system. The
rules of evidence should be amended to reduce the disparity in the
admissibility of consistent and inconsistent statements. This reform would
enhance truth seeking and would promote the fair treatment of witnesses.
Presently, the rules regulating the admission of prior consistent
statements are under-inclusive in many respects. FRE 801(d)(1)(B) 272 and
its state counterparts only allow prior consistent statements after a very
particular type of impeachment-a suggestion of fabrication or improper
influence-excluding other common impeachment grounds, such as
allegations of honest bias or fading memory.27 3 Not only does Rule
801(d)(1)(B) require a motive to lie, but the rule requires that this motive
270. Mike McPhee, Bryant Deposition in Tussle, Denver Post, Dec. 7, 2004, at B2.
271. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) (providing that the government cannot lead off with
evidence of the defendant's character for violence, but if the defendant puts the victim's
character for violence at issue, then the government can prove that the defendant has the
traits he imputed to the victim).
272. FRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ...
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
273. Id.
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must have arisen recently. 274 In other words, if a defendant alleges that an
accuser conjured up a battery charge because she has wanted a divorce for
the last five years, her motive might not be sufficiently "recent" to allow
rehabilitation with prior consistent statements. Finally, the U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted FRE 801(d)(1)(B) to require that the consistent
statement must have preceded the inception of the motive to lie.275 The
required temporal sequence is not always easy to discern: For example,
when a defendant claims his former spouse fabricated an abuse claim
because she anticipated a custody battle, how can the court pinpoint the date
when the motive to lie arose? Where no discrete time period can be
ascertained, it is impossible to assess whether the consistent statement is
truly antecedent, and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will not apply. 276
This restrictive approach to prior consistent statements contrasts sharply
with the rules for prior inconsistent statements. Most states allow
substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement merely upon a showing of
inconsistency, with no additional requirements relating to the recency of the
statement,277 and few requirements for the setting of the statement. 278 The
wide divergence of the rules for prior consistent statements and prior
inconsistent statements leaves the impression that the law would rather
embarrass witnesses than restore their credibility.
A better approach would be to admit any prior consistent statement after
an attack on the witness's credibility makes the statement relevant, provided
that prejudice does not substantially outweigh probative value. Such a rule
would offer several advantages. First, it would end some courts' confusing
practice of admitting prior consistent statements for "nonsubstantive
purposes" when the statements do not meet Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s
requirements. 279 Second, the amended rule would potentially allow juries
to consider a new set of statements for their truthfulness without a temporal
cutoff that may or may not coincide with the boundary of relevancy in a
274. Id.
275. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158-60 (1995) (ruling that prior consistent
statements by an alleged victim of child abuse were not admissible under FRE 801(d)(1)(B)
because the statements did not necessarily predate the inception of the accuser's alleged
motive to lie-her interest in living with her mother rather the defendant).
276. Id.
277. David F. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 39:2 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that no state
imposes recency requirements for prior inconsistent statements); see Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)(A) (same).
278. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (stating that most states follow the federal approach and
require that a prior inconsistent statement must have been made in a trial, hearing, grand
jury, or deposition, but a sizeable minority of states do not require any particular setting).
279. Professor Lynn McLain notes that "[m]ost post-Federal Rules of Evidence cases in
the lower courts have permitted the use of statements not qualifying under [FRE
801(d)(1)(B)], but nonetheless relevant to the witness's credibility, for the limited purpose of
rehabilitation only, and not as substantive evidence." Lynn McLain, Post-Crawford: Time to
Liberalize the Substantive Admissibility of a Testifying Witness's Prior Consistent
Statements, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming Dec. 2005) (manuscript at 17, on file with
author).
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particular case. 280 Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, the
new rule would ensure that the accuser is not simply a punching bag during
cross-examination: Attacks on credibility could be parried with prior
consistent statements just as easily as attacks on credibility could be
mounted with prior inconsistent statements.
F. Greater Symmetry in Rules Regulating Character Evidence
Congress and state legislatures should consider reducing, but not limiting
altogether, the disparity between the treatment of character evidence
regarding the accused and character evidence regarding the accuser. The
current asymmetry causes difficulty for both the defendant and the victim.
To begin with, evidence of "prior bad acts" by the accuser should be
subject to the same notice requirements that are applicable when the
government offers such evidence concerning the accused. In passing the
rape shield laws, Congress and state legislatures inserted a pretrial notice
requirement of fourteen days, reflecting an understanding that the difficulty
of cross-examination increases when accusers do not know in advance what
embarrassing evidence they will face at trial. 281  If such notice is
appropriate for evidence of prior sexual conduct, then notice also seems
necessary for evidence of other extrinsic conduct under Rule 404(b).
Requiring that defendants give pretrial notice of 404(b) evidence would not
violate their due process rights. As in the case of notice by the government
to defendants, the requirement could be waived upon a showing that the
proponent was not aware of this evidence, or the need for this evidence,
before the deadline for notice. The defendant should have little difficulty
foreseeing the need to offer 404(b) evidence against the accuser, because
virtually every accuser must testify in a prosecution of domestic violence or
sexual assault after Crawford. In any event, "trial by ambush" is not a
constitutional right. The evidentiary rules do not tolerate the introduction
of an accuser's sexual conduct by surprise, and they should not tolerate the
introduction of other extrinsic acts by surprise either.
Congress should also eliminate FRE 413 and 414, which allow the
prosecution to offer any evidence of prior similar crimes by a defendant
charged with child molestation or sexual assault, even if that evidence
would not otherwise be admissible under FRE 404(b). Few states have
adopted such rules, but some commentators and legislative leaders have
urged the replication of FRE 413 and 414.282 These rules are objectionable
for many reasons. To begin with, they posit that the rationale for excluding
evidence of extrinsic acts has varying importance depending on the
280. Tome, 513 U.S. at 169-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that prior consistent
statements could be relevant even if they did not necessarily precede the inception of the
alleged motive to lie).
281. Fed. R. Evid. 412; 6 Weinstein, supra note 121, at T-46 to T-50 (listing state analogs
of Rule 412).
282. Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Criminal History: The Trouble With Rule
404(b), 78 Temp. L. Rev. 201, 239, 251-52 (2005).
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charge-an absurd proposition that masks Congress's more cynical interest
in appearing "tough" on unpopular crimes. Second, FRE 413 and 414
result in unequal treatment of Native Americans, who are virtually the only
defendants prosecuted in federal court for crimes of violence against
women. 283 Third-and most relevant for present purposes-the blatant
disregard for defendants' rights that is evident in FRE 413 and 414
promotes similar disregard for accusers' privacy. In a trial where the
government has introduced a long list of prior misdeeds by the accused, the
trial court will naturally be inclined to allow admission of similar evidence
against the accuser. This Solomon-like approach is not mandated by any
evidentiary rule, but it is a fact of life in court. In other words, the fair
treatment of defendants under FRE 404(b) makes the fair treatment of
accusers more likely.284
Shortcomings in FRE 404(a) and its state counterparts also cry out for
reform. The most common state version of Rule 404(a) allows the
defendant, and only the defendant, to open the door for the admission of
character evidence regarding the accuser. The defendant can open the door
in two ways: (1) by attacking the accuser's character himself, or (2) in a
homicide case, by simply arguing that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor. Thus, in a domestic violence case that did not lead to a fatality,
the defendant may assert that the accuser was the first aggressor, but the
government may not respond with evidence of the accuser's generally
peaceful character. This asymmetry must certainly be maddening for
accusers, and it must heighten their aversion to criminal trials. A better
approach would be to allow the government to introduce evidence of the
alleged victim's character in any case (not simply a homicide case) in which
the defendant has asserted that the alleged victim was the first aggressor.
G. Narrative Testimony at Intervals During Cross-Examination
Rule 611, which authorizes judges to supervise the mode of cross-
examination, should include explicit language to allow narrative testimony
by the accuser. This narrative testimony should not supplant cross-
examination. The accuser should be allowed to speak briefly without
interruption at intervals during cross-examination-for example, after a
certain number of questions, or after the cross-examining attorney has
finished a major topic. Allowing such narrative testimony would put the
283. Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against
Women, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 687, 688-89 (2003).
284. In addition, accusers themselves are concerned about fair treatment of defendants.
Unfair treatment of defendants may discourage future reporting by victims of domestic
violence and sexual assault. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's
Response to Domestic Violence, 43 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1903-04 (2002). Failing to
respect defendants' rights in court actually increases the likelihood of recidivism. Id. at 1846.
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United States in the company of several other nations that permit accusers
to tell their stories in their own words. 285
At present, one of the most exasperating aspects of trial is the tendency
of the prosecutor and defense lawyer to substitute their language for the
words that the accuser would have chosen. Counsel's lexicon is frequently
reductive, sexist, and rife with stereotypes. 286  The leading questions
permitted in cross-examination only allow the witness to affirm or deny the
proposition set forth by counsel, 287 not to tell the story in her own words.
Rule 613 recognizes that witnesses need an opportunity to interject their
own explanations, but this rule applies only to impeachment with prior
consistent statements, 288 leaving no formal mechanisms for accusers to
speak in their own terms after impeachment alleging bias, sensory or
cognitive defects, or poor character for truthfulness.
While narrative testimony is rarely permissible for victims under current
law, defendants can avail themselves of this procedure. In particular, where
defense counsel believes that the accused is about to lie, defense counsel
can absolve herself of any complicity in unethical conduct merely by
instructing the client to testify in narrative form.289  Ironically, narrative
testimony liberates the defense from ethical strictures, while the refusal to
allow narrative testimony puts accusers in a straitjacket.
A new rule permitting narrative testimony at intervals during cross-
examination would help to vent the accuser's frustration. This rule would
reduce the sense of subordination that pervades rape and domestic violence
trials. At the same time, the intermittent use of narrative testimony during
cross-examination would not violate defendants' constitutional rights. A
few courts have upheld trial courts' authorization of narrative testimony by
285. E.g., People of the Philippines v. Pedking Calixtro, G.R. No. 92355 (S.C. Jan. 24,
1991), available at www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri 1991/jan1991/gr92355_1991 .html
(allowing narrative testimony by the accuser in a rape prosecution); Pizzi & Perron, supra
note 239, at 42-44 (discussing liberal admission of narrative testimony by crime victims in
German courts).
286. Taslitz, supra note 18, at 111-13 (analyzing gendered, oversimplified questioning
during cross-examination in rape trials). Taslitz urges that accusers be permitted to testify in
long, uninterrupted narratives. Id. at 115-17. The present Article, by contrast, offers a more
modest proposal, suggesting that accusers have an opportunity to testify for a short period
without interruption.
287. Fed. R. Evid. 61 l(c) (permitting use of leading questions that require "yes" or "no"
answers during cross-examination).
288. Fed R. Evid. 613(b) (allowing all witnesses other than party-opponents to explain or
deny alleged inconsistent statements raised in cross-examination).
289. Nathan M. Crystal, False Testimony by Criminal Defendants: Still Unanswered
Ethical and Constitutional Questions, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1529, 1556 (noting that defense
counsel may resort to narrative testimony if counsel believes that his client may be about to
lie); Steve Morris et al., Rules of Professional Conduct, Ethical Conflicts Facing Litigators,
and Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations, in Civil Practice and Litigation Techniquest in
Federal and State Courts, Annual Advanced ALI/ABA Course of Study 655, 727,
(ALI/ABA 2005) (stating that narrative testimony "continues to be a commonly accepted
method of dealing with client perjury").
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vulnerable victims;290 these opinions reason that the procedure helps
accusers much more than it hurts defendants. Indeed, under the procedure
proposed here, the defendant would still be free to ask leading questions for
as long as he desired during cross-examination; the defendant would just
need to let the accuser up for air from time to time.
A trilateral adversarial model is necessary to understand why narrative
testimony has occurred so rarely in criminal trials to date. Victims'
interests in speaking with their own voices diverge from defendants'
interests in minimizing victims' involvement. Prosecutors also are reluctant
to permit narrative testimony by victims, because some prosecutors fear
victims will sabotage the government's case,291 and even victims loyal to
the prosecution will probably not follow the prosecutor's ideal order of
presentation unless prompted by questions.
The victim simply needs to use her own voice at trial, and a rule change
is necessary to make her voice heard during cross-examination. Two hours
of answering "yes" or "no" is not testimony; it is subjugation.
H. Strict Test for Pro Se Cross-Examination by Accusers
Rule 611 should be amended so that judges have clear authority to
prohibit pro se defendants from directly cross-examining their accusers in
prosecutions of domestic violence and sexual assault. The revised rule
should specify alternative means through which pro se accusers can
indirectly confront the alleged victims. For example, the court could
appoint stand-by counsel solely for the purpose of cross-examining the
accuser, and the defendant could submit written questions for counsel to ask
in cross-examination (subject to counsel's discretion). The United States
should join the growing list of nations that prohibit or significantly limit pro
se cross-examination of accusers in prosecutions of rape and other similar
crimes.292
290. E.g., Burroughs v. State, 366 S.E.2d 378, 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a
conviction where the trial court had allowed an alleged rape victim to testify in narrative
form); People v. Collins, No. 249568, 2005 WL 1683545, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19,
2005) (finding no error in presenting narrative testimony by an accuser in a prosecution for
sexual assault); Chancellor v. State, No. 06-03-00051-CR, 2004 WL 299856, at *4 (Tex.
App. Feb. 18, 2004) (declining to find that the defendant received ineffective assistance of
counsel when the defense attorney failed to object to the accuser's narrative testimony in the
prosecution for sexual assault).
291. Busching, supra note 53.
292. Among the countries that have adopted, or are considering, restrictions on pro se
cross-examination are Australia, Great Britain, and Scotland. Carr Plea for Speed on Rape
Victim Bill, Fairfax Sun-Herald, Aug. 24, 2003, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/23/1061529376490.html?from=storyrhs
(describing Australian reforms); Government's Crime Reduction Strategy (July 16, 2001)
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/crsdoc9.htm; New Rape Law 'Will Protect Victims,' BBC
News, Nov. 1, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/scotland/2384143.stm (discussing
new laws in Great Britain and Scotland).
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The need for such a rule is manifest. A substantial number of defendants
choose to represent themselves. 293 Pro se cross-examination provides one
last opportunity for the defendant to torment the victim.294 Indeed, some
defendants assert the right to represent themselves solely because they want
to cross-examine a youthful accuser 295-perhaps in the hope that the
prospect of this ordeal will dissuade the accuser from proceeding with the
prosecution. One defendant accused of rape conducted a five-day cross-
examination of the young accuser while wearing the same clothes he wore
on the date of the charged offense.296 Colin Ferguson, who shot nineteen
victims on the Long Island Expressway in 1993, turned his pro se cross-
examination of the survivors into a circus.297
Even when pro se defendants are not so malicious, they are usually inept.
They fail to appreciate the subtle art of effective cross-examination, and
they attempt simply to badger the witness. 298 Pro se defendants sometimes
attempt to offer their own opinions during cross-examination, unaware that
the rules of evidence do not permit such argument at this juncture.299 Pro
293. Marie Higgins Williams, The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counsel, and the
Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined Roles, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 789, 792 (2002) (citations
omitted) (noting that a substantial number of defendants demand to appear pro se); see
Burman, supra note 109, at 240-41 (noting that pro se defendants are entitled to cross-
examine accusers in domestic violence cases under present law); Kathryn M. Reardon,
Acquaintance Rape at Private Colleges and Universities: Providing for Victims' Educational
and Civil Rights, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 395, 412 n.93 (2005) ("[I]n the ordinary criminal
[justice] context defendants representing themselves pro se do conduct cross-examinations of
victim-witnesses.").
294. Paul G. Cassell & Evan S. Strassberg, Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child
Molestation: Reforming Utah Law to Permit the Propensity Inference, 1998 Utah L. Rev.
145, 146-48 (recounting the facts of the State v. Doporto case, in which the defendant
accused of raping a young girl was allowed to cross-examine her pro se; when the accuser
broke down during questioning at the sentencing hearing, the accuser's outraged father
jumped up and punched the defendant, sending him to the hospital); Reardon, supra note
293, at 412 (expressing concern about "broadly scoped and terrorizing questioning of
victims" by pro se defendants).
295. E.g., State v. Carrico, No. 38127-0-1, 1998 WL 372732, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July
6, 1998) (reporting that the defendant announced that he preferred to proceed pro se so he
could cross-examine the accuser himself).
296. New Rape Law 'Will Protect Victims,' supra note 292.
297. Williams, supra note 293, at 811-12 (observing that "the sight of [defendant] Colin
Ferguson parading up and down the courtroom and cross-examining the nineteen survivors
of his shooting rampage" provoked national outcry); Larry McShane, Ferguson's Trial
Tactics May Set Stage for Appeal, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 19, 1995, at 3.
298. Christopher G. Frey, The State v. The Self-Represented: A Florida Prosecutor's
Concerns When Litigating Against a Pro Se Defendant in a Criminal Trial, 29 Stetson L.
Rev. 181, 191 (1999). Frey wrote as follows:
Cross-examination is an art that requires practice and a full understanding of the
object of the cross-examination. Pro se defendants, because they are often
unskilled and unpracticed in the art of cross-examination, do not understand what
they are doing or why they are doing it. They simply attack and badger the
witness.
Id.
299. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 36, 49 (2002) (discussing that pro
se cross-examination can be argumentative).
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se defendants are not subject to the ethical rules for lawyers, and they have
little fear of losing their right to practice law, so they are less likely than
lawyers to comport themselves in a civil manner.
To be sure, a pro se defendant has the same right to confrontation as a
defendant with counsel. 30 0 Yet the trial court does not violate the pro se
defendant's constitutional rights by requiring an intermediary to question
the accuser. In Maryland v. Craig30 1-a 1990 ruling that withstood the
more recent Crawford ruling3 2-the Supreme Court allowed some
limitations on the method of cross-examination in order to protect
vulnerable accusers from the hardship of an unfettered cross-examination.
In particular, the Court allowed remote testimony on closed-circuit
television by a child whom the defendant had allegedly abused. The Court
held that the slight diminution in the immediacy of cross-examination was
worthwhile to advance the policy goals of minimizing witnesses' trauma
and encouraging reporting of crime by future victims. 30 3 Lower courts have
used similar reasoning to limit pro se defendants' ability to cross-examine
accusers directly. 3°4 Indeed, the substitution of standby counsel is far less
burdensome on defendants than the remote testimony permitted in Craig;
defendants with standby counsel can still confront the witnesses face to
face, and the quality of questioning actually improves because of counsel's
greater expertise.
The issue of pro se cross-examination exemplifies the disjunction of
prosecutors' and victims' interests, and demonstrates once again why a
trilateral adversarial model is necessary. Many prosecutors actually favor
pro se representation (so long as the defendant receives an adequate
admonition of the rights he is waiving). Prosecutors know that the
ineptitude of the pro se defendant, combined with the unseemly spectacle of
an accused rapist bullying the alleged victim in cross-examination, greatly
increases the likelihood of conviction. Victims, on the other hand, view pro
300. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (stating that the accused has the
constitutional right to represent himself, and he does not forfeit other constitutional rights by
deciding to proceed pro se).
301. 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
302. Craig survives Crawford because Craig addressed the type of cross-examination that
is required under the Sixth Amendment, while Crawford addressed whether cross-
examination is necessary at all. See People v. Hinds, No. 250668, 2005 WL 657469, at *2-3
(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005) (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 853, with approval after
Crawford).
303. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-54 (holding that the "[s]tate's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims" was "sufficiently important to outweigh ...
a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court" if denial of this face-to-face
confrontation was necessary to protect the accuser from "emotional trauma").
304. E.g., Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1034-37 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the
right to confrontation was not violated by denying pro se defendants the opportunity to
cross-examine an accuser directly in a prosecution for sexually abusing a child); State v.
Carrico, No. 38127-0-4, 1998 WL 372732, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 6, 1998) (finding no
constitutional violation where the trial court prohibited the defendant from cross-examining
an alleged victim of child abuse).
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se cross-examination as a legally sanctioned reprisal by the assailant against
whom they sought protection.
I. Prohibition of Appeal Waivers in Plea Agreements
A new rule of criminal procedure is necessary to end prosecutors'
practice of requiring appeal waivers as a condition for entering into plea
agreements. The insistence on such waivers is commonplace.305 After the
recent turmoil in confrontation law and sentencing law, however,
defendants are increasingly reluctant to waive their appellate rights. Survey
data indicate a decline in guilty pleas and an increase in appeals based on
the recent Supreme Court decisions.306 In this environment, prosecutors'
demand for appeal waivers is forcing more trials-and more trials mean
more testimony by accusers.
A ban on appeal waivers in plea agreements would be salutary in many
respects. First and foremost for present purposes, the new rule would
increase the number of guilty pleas, because defendants could retain their
appellate rights even if they decided not to go to trial. The appellate courts
would more quickly establish the boundaries of Crawford, Blakely, and
Booker if appeal waivers did not delay the presentation of test cases for
review. Finally, as some courts have observed, plea offers contingent upon
appeal waivers are against public policy because they allow prosecutors to
manipulate charges and thereby evade appellate review. 307
The practice of requiring appeal waivers exemplifies once again the
tension between prosecutors and victims, and the need for a trilateral
adversarial model. If one conceives of the criminal trial simply as a
bilateral contest between the government and the defendant, then demands
for appeal waivers seem to be a reasonable, efficient strategy. These
demands may push some defendants to trial who would otherwise plead
guilty if they could retain their appellate rights, but from the prosecutors'
standpoint, that risk is more than outweighed by the time savings when
305. Michael Zachary, Interpretation of Problematic Federal Criminal Appeal Waivers,
28 Vt. L. Rev. 149, 150-51 (2003) (noting that in the federal system, ninety-five percent of
all criminal cases are resolved by plea; "[many-if not most-of those guilty pleas are the
result of plea agreements, and many-if not most--of those plea agreements contain waivers
of the defendant's right to appeal"); Alan J. Chaset, Improving the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Can We Get There From Here?, Champion, June 2004, at 8 (noting that appeal
waivers are "standard" and "nearly universal" in plea agreements).
306. See infra app. A (question 4) (providing that fifty-nine percent of respondents
indicated that defendants are less likely to plead guilty after Crawford.); infra app. B
(question 8) (noting that sixty-eight percent of respondents indicated that appeals of
sentences had increased as a result of Blakely and Booker).
307. E.g., United States v. Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 61 (D. Mass. 1999).
Despite the attraction of the idea of maximizing a defendant's power by
allowing him to sell whatever he has, the market for plea bargains, like every other
market, should not be so deregulated that the conditions essential to assuring basic
fairness are undermined .... [A]ppeal waiver clauses . . . are contrary to public
policy and void.
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other defendants agree to forego appeals. 308 Victims have an entirely
different view. Appeals will not require the victims' testimony, but trials
will. Appeals raise the remote risk that the defendants will prevail, but
victims can take comfort in the fact that the overwhelming majority of
convictions are upheld.30 9 So the utility of appeal waivers is lost on
victims, but the burden of additional trials falls heavily on victims.
Prosecutors should earn their paychecks by litigating appeals. When they
insist on appeal waivers and thereby increase the number of trials,
prosecutors shift the burden from the government to the victims. If
defendants could appeal more, then the criminal justice system would
appeal more to victims.
J. New Sentencing Guideline for Acceptance of Responsibility
All states should adopt straightforward sentencing guidelines-or statutes
in states without sentencing guidelines-to clarify the sentencing discount
that defendants will receive if they plead guilty in advance of trial. The
new rules should impose a plea deadline of at least ten days before trial,
although this deadline should be suspended when the government has failed
to provide discovery of all the material evidence before the plea deadline.
Such an approach would be preferable to the present mishmash of
unpredictable rules, departures, and "informal understandings" that
determine the plea discount in each jurisdiction. The federal sentencing
guidelines include a provision, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 3E1.l,
that allows a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 310 but this
provision lacks a clear deadline for guilty pleas, and it even allows a
defendant who goes to trial to earn full credit for acceptance of
responsibility. Among the twenty-two states with sentencing guidelines,
this Article's survey revealed that none has a particular guideline specifying
the conditions for, and the extent of, the plea discount; only a few of the
twenty-two jurisdictions allow downward departures for guilty pleas, but
the rules in these jurisdictions provide little guidance to the judges and
parties. 311 In the remaining twenty-eight states without any sentencing
guidelines, the procedure for reducing sentences after guilty pleas is
generally not memorialized in a rule or statute. A study by Professor Nancy
308. Prosecutors fear appeals not only because of the time commitment required for
appellate briefs and arguments, but also because appeals risk the possibility of creating new
rules that will apply throughout the jurisdiction.
309. In fact, the reversal rate for criminal convictions is so low that the Federal Rules of
Evidence allow impeachment with convictions under appeal. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 note.
310. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3El.l(b) (2003) (authorizing a three-level
reduction in the defendant's offense level if he "has assisted authorities in the investigation
or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter
a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial").
311. See infra app. B (questions 9 and 10).
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King and others in 2005 found wide variation in the methodologies used by
trial courts to compute plea discounts.312
Why is a rule preferable to roulette? Clear language delineating the
timeliness requirement for a guilty plea, and providing a substantial
discount for foregoing trial, will result in more pretrial dispositions and less
cross-examination of accusers. It is not necessary to give a greater
sentencing reduction than judges presently award; rather, it is simply
necessary to codify procedures that will yield approximately the same
average discounts. The federal experience with U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Section 3El.1 has established the constitutionality of this approach,
notwithstanding arguments that the plea discount burdens the exercise of
the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.313
One additional modification to the "plea discount" rule is important:
Defendants should not be eligible for this discount if they have pursued
tactics that created substantial hardship for accusers. As opposed to the
current federal approach, no defendant should receive credit for acceptance
of responsibility if he has cross-examined the accuser at trial.
The present version of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Section 3E1.1
conditions acceptance of responsibility not upon the accused's conduct vis-
A-vis the accuser, but rather upon the defendant's alacrity in sparing the
government the burden of trial preparation. 314 If government attorneys feel
that trial preparation is so burdensome, perhaps they should consider
another line of work. The bipolar paradigm has unduly stressed the
convenience of prosecutors and underemphasized the hardship suffered by
accusers at trial. 315 The new rule authorizing plea discounts should make
clear that the most important consideration is not the defendants' contrition
312. Nancy King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 959,
961 (2005). The various means of discounting sentences after pleas include the following:
Downward dispositional or durational departures from the presumptive or standard
range, dropping sentencing enhancements, sentencing in the mitigated range or at
the bottom of the standard range, capping the sentence within the standard range,
or making use of discretionary alternative sentences, such as treatment programs,
suspended sentences, or stayed sentences.
Id. at 975-76 (citations omitted).
313. United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1479-80 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(upholding U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 3E1.1 against attack that it penalizes the
exercise of trial rights); see Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) (finding
constitutional a state rule that authorized more lenient sentences for defendants waiving a
jury trial). But see King et al., supra note 312, at 966 (suggesting that policy and
constitutional issues surrounding plea discounts are ambiguous).
314. See supra note 310.
315. For example, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines section 3El.l, when a Bruton
problem requires a prosecutor to try a succession of defendants for the same crime, using the
same witnesses, the incremental trial preparation for the prosecutor in each successive trial is
negligible, but the incremental burden on the victims/witnesses may still be significant. If
the sole criterion determining a defendant's eligibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
section 3E1.1 was the government's trial preparation, then one of the defendants in this
hypothetical might merit a plea discount even though he does not enter a plea until the eve of
trial (much to the chagrin of the victims in the case).
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or the government's expediency, but the extent to which the defendant has
burdened victims of his crime by subjecting them to cross-examination and
necessitating that they prepare for trial.
CONCLUSION
Professor Wigmore famously declared that cross-examination is the
greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth.3 16 In 2005,
however, that engine is in danger of overheating. A number of factors have
recently compounded the difficulty of cross-examination. These factors
include Supreme Court decisions that increase the likelihood and difficulty
of accusers' testimony, the erosion of evidentiary privileges, greater media
coverage, higher sentences that alter defendants' trial tactics, and misguided
reforms designed to protect victims' rights.
Of course, cross-examination is supposed to be difficult. The seat will
always be hot, no matter what the nature of the case, and no matter who is
under cross-examination. When Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued
a plea for the Senate to show restraint in its interrogation of Supreme Court
nominee John Roberts 317 these comments underscored an ineluctable truth:
Cross-examination is inherently difficult, even for the most sophisticated
and stalwart witness.
Yet special safeguards are necessary in prosecutions of domestic violence
and sexual assault for the simple reason that the increasing tribulation of
cross-examination is deterring the reporting of these crimes. The criminal
justice system cannot afford to traumatize complainants. Statistics released
in June 2005 show that more than 500,000 rapes and several million
episodes of domestic violence went unreported over a four-year period in
the United States. A significant reason for this underreporting is the
victims' fear of the criminal justice system, and of cross-examination in
particular.
This Article has offered a set of proposals that would pour some much-
needed oil in the engine of cross-examination. The reforms listed herein
would modify the admission of certain evidence regarding the accuser's
sexual history, her mental health counseling, and her parallel civil litigation
against the alleged assailant. Other proposals would prevent pro se cross-
examination of the accused, would increase pretrial notice of certain
impeachment strategies, and would prohibit prosecutors from demanding
appeal waivers as a condition for plea agreements. This Article has
proposed that an accuser should have her own lawyer with standing to raise
evidentiary objections on the accuser's behalf. Courts should permit
narrative testimony by the accuser at intervals during cross-examination,
and courts should more liberally admit evidence of the accuser's prior
316. 5 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 (J. Chadbourne ed., 1974).
317. John Gibeaut, Gonzales Suggests Restraint in Roberts Questioning, A.B.A. J. E-
Rep., Aug. 12, 2005.
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consistent statements. Finally, states should standardize their procedures
for allowing sentencing reductions when defendants forego trial.
The defendant's right to confront witnesses cannot yield to utilitarian
concerns about the burden on victims. Yet within the parameters set by the
Constitution, there is space to fine-tune the rules governing cross-
examination. The truth-seeking goal of cross-examination will be
furthered, not hindered, by proposals that alleviate victims' ordeals and
ensure their attendance at trial.
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APPENDIX A: RESULTS FROM SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS' OFFICES3 18
1. Has the Crawford decision significantly impeded prosecutions of
domestic violence in your office?
63% answered yes (61% in California, 89% in Oregon, and 41% in
Washington).
2. Are prosecutors in your jurisdiction more likely to call victims as
witnesses in domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford?
80% answered yes (83% in California, 88% in Oregon, and 71% in
Washington).
3. After Crawford, is your office more likely to dismiss domestic
violence charges when the victim is unavailable or refuses to cooperate?
76% answered yes (80% in California, 79% in Oregon, and 68% in
Washington).
4. Are defendants in domestic violence cases less likely to plead guilty
after Crawford?
59% answered yes (48% in California, 84% in Oregon, and 48% in
Washington).
5. Are battered women less safe in your jurisdiction after Crawford?
65% answered yes (59% in California, 82% in Oregon, and 57% in
Washington).
318. This survey was conducted from October 2004 to January 2005. The survey
involved twenty-three counties in California (which collectively included eighty-eight
percent of California's population), nineteen counties in Oregon (which collectively included
ninety-four percent of Oregon's population), and twenty-two counties in Washington (which
collectively included ninety-six percent of Washington's population). The counties involved
in the survey ranged in size from several million residents to fewer than 10,000 residents. In
each county, the survey was presented to the supervisor of domestic violence prosecutions,
or in the absence of such a supervisor, the survey was presented to the elected prosecuting
attorney or to an attorney with substantial involvement in the prosecution of domestic
violence. The survey was conducted by phone and by e-mail. Respondents were informed
that their answers would not be attributed to individual offices, and that only the aggregate
data would be public. Respondents had the option of answering "yes," "no," or "not
applicable" in response to each question. Responses of "not applicable" were excluded from
the percentage tallies. Records of all respondents' answers are on file with the author.
Appendix A is reproduced in its entirely from the author's previous article, Prosecuting
Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 820-22 (2005).
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6. Prior to Crawford, did your office rely on testimonial hearsay in more
than half of domestic violence prosecutions?
54% answered yes (43% in California, 89% in Oregon, and 36% in
Washington).
7. Prior to Crawford, did victims testify in the majority of domestic
violence trials?
83% answered yes (87% in California, 76% in Oregon, and 85% in
Washington).
8. Does your office rely on testimonial hearsay in more than half of all
domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford?
32% answered yes (17% in California, 67% in Oregon, and 18% in
Washington).
9. In your jurisdiction, is it more difficult to introduce 911 calls into
evidence after Crawford?
56% answered yes (43% in California, 69% in Oregon, and 58% in
Washington).
10. Do you believe that 911 calls should generally be admissible in
domestic violence prosecutions after Crawford?
95% answered yes (96% in California, 100% in Oregon, and 90% in
Washington).
11. In your jurisdiction, is it more difficult to introduce hearsay
statements elicited by police from victims of domestic violence at the scene
of the alleged crime?
87% answered yes (83% in California, 95% in Oregon, and 84% in
Washington).
12. In particular, is it more difficult after Crawford to introduce such
statements when you have characterized them as excited utterances?
52% answered yes (59% in California, 56% in Oregon, and 41% in
Washington).
13. When subpoenaed as a witness in a domestic violence trial, is a
victim likely to be cooperative with the prosecution?
9% answered yes (5% in California, 0% in Oregon, and 20% in
Washington).
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14. Are the majority of domestic violence charges misdemeanors in your
jurisdiction?
82% answered yes (77% in California, 79% in Oregon, and 90% in
Washington).
15. In your jurisdiction, are the majority of domestic violence defendants
out of custody for at least a portion of the period between the initial
appearance and the trial?
90% answered yes (86% in California, 100% in Oregon, and 86% in
Washington).
16. In your jurisdiction, is pretrial release of defendants a factor that
leads victims to recant or refuse to cooperate by the time of trial?
90% answered yes (82% in California, 94% in Oregon, and 95% in
Washington).
17. Would the safety of domestic violence victims be enhanced if
pretrial detention of defendants were more common?
92% answered yes (86% in California, 95% in Oregon, and 95% in
Washington).
18. Does pretrial cross-examination of victims take place in more than
half of domestic violence cases in your jurisdiction at the present time?
29% answered yes (43% in California, 16% in Oregon, and 25% in
Washington).
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS FROM SURVEY OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AT
STATE SENTENCING COMMISSIONS
3 19
1. Prior to 2005, were sentencing guidelines mandatory, presumptive, or
advisory in your state?
41% indicated guidelines were mandatory or presumptive; 59% indicated
guidelines were advisory.
2. Are sentencing guidelines now mandatory, presumptive, or advisory
in your state?
36% indicated guidelines are mandatory or presumptive; 59% indicated
guidelines are advisory; 5% answered N/A.
3. Did the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and/or Booker decrease
the predictability of sentencing in your jurisdiction during the period from
June 2004 to June 2005?
78% answered yes among jurisdictions with mandatory or presumptive
guidelines; 0% answered yes among jurisdictions with advisory guidelines.
4. Have the Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely and/or Booker
increased the appeals of sentences in your jurisdiction?
82% answered yes among jurisdictions with mandatory or presumptive
guidelines; 0% answered yes among jurisdictions with advisory guidelines.
5. Which of the following best describes your jurisdiction's response to
Blakely?
(a) No change
(b) "Substantive fix" (enlargement of sentencing ranges in guideline grid)
(c) "Procedural fix" (submission of more issues to the jury)
(d) None of the above
55% chose (a); 14% chose (b); 27% chose (c); 9% chose (d).
319. This survey was conducted in the summer and fall of 2005. The survey involved all
the sentencing commissions that are members of the National Association of Sentencing
Commissions ("NASC"). The jurisdictions involved with NASC include the following:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. The
survey was presented to the executive director of each sentencing commission, or if this
official was unavailable, to another official of the sentencing commission who had
familiarity with that jurisdiction's response to Blakely.
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6. If your jurisdiction has responded to Blakely with a "procedural fix,"
which of the following best describes your jurisdiction's approach?
(a) Bifurcation of jury proceedings into guilt phase and sentencing phase
(b) Single jury trial addressing all facts that could increase sentencing
range
(c) Both (a) and (b)
(d) None of the above
17% chose (a); 33% chose (b); 50% chose (c); 0% chose (d).
7. If your jurisdiction has responded to Blakely with bifurcated jury
proceedings, will your jurisdiction's evidence code apply to the portion of
the jury proceedings addressing sentencing issues?
50% answered yes; 17% answered no; 3% answered N/A.
8. Do you believe that the sentencing procedures necessitated by Blakely
and/or Booker will lengthen the testimony of accusers and victims before
the jury, as compared with the era preceding June 2004?
72% answered yes; 36% answered no.
9. Does your jurisdiction have a sentencing guideline that provides a
sentence reduction for defendants who timely notify the government of
their intent to plead guilty?
14% answered yes; 86% answered no.
10. If you answered yes to question nine, does the relevant guideline or
statute take account of the defendant's conduct vis-A-vis the victim either
prior to or during trial?
0% answered yes; 100% answered no.
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